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A Comparative Approach to Economic
Espionage: Is Any Nation Effectively
Dealing With This Global Threat?
MELANIE REID*
In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act
(EEA), 18 U.S.C. Sections 1831 and 1832, to help thwart attempts by foreign entities intent on stealing U.S. proprietary
information and trade secrets. Despite the passage of the
EEA almost twenty years ago, if recent statistics are to be
believed, there is so much trade secret thievery going around
that the United States finds itself in the midst of an epidemic
of economic espionage. Currently, any and all U.S. technology that is vulnerable and profitable is being targeted. Unfortunately, existing remedies and enforcement have barely
blunted the onslaught against the U.S. which faces, according to the IP Commission Report, a potential 300 billion dollar loss of raw innovation every year. To date, there have
only been a handful of § 1831 convictions since the Act was
passed. That is hardly a deterrence or something to send
shudders down the backs of would-be industrial spies. Despite U.S. shortcomings, the rest of the world has not done
any better.
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This article explores the reasons behind the U.S. government’s two-pronged approach: preventing the thefts by educating and training private companies to improve security
and safeguard their secrets, and reacting to acts of economic
espionage by federally prosecuting offenders under the EEA,
and why this approach is not succeeding. The U.S. approach
has been weak for several reasons: (1) the EEA, specifically,
18 U.S.C. § 1831, has been difficult to prove; (2) the sentences under § 1831 have been minimal; (3) despite being
educated on the pitfalls of lax cybersecurity and personnel
controls, there is a lack of buy-in from private industry to
cooperate with law enforcement and/or tighten office security measures to prevent IP theft; (4) the federal government
has taken a relatively hands-off approach in assisting private enterprise; and (5) other countries do not assist in international investigations due to their own weak response or
individual attitudes towards intellectual property theft or in
some cases, are the same foreign countries involved in the
theft. This article also examines how various countries are
handling the economic espionage threat and how differences
in cultural, historical, and nationalistic backgrounds as well
as economic and political governance allow some countries
to be unapologetic supporters of state-sponsored economic
espionage. The overall global response to economic espionage is weak, and a stronger U.S. response is needed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Our workers are the most productive on Earth, and if the playing field is level, I promise you—America will always win.”
– Pres. Barack Obama1
When Americans are asked the question, what is the single,
greatest foreign threat to our nation’s economic health and stability,
many will say it is the transfer of American manufacturing jobs to
other countries such as China and Korea. While it is true that millions of manufacturing jobs have been moved overseas,2 there is an
1

EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY OF MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS
7 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_
strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [hereinafter TRADE
SECRETS].
2
PETER NAVARRO & GREG AUTRY, DEATH BY CHINA: CONFRONTING THE
DRAGON—A GLOBAL CALL TO ACTION (Prentice Hall 2011). “Since China joined
the World Trade Organization in 2001 and falsely promised to end its mercantilist
and protectionist practices, America’s apparel, textile, and wood furniture industries have shrunk to half their size—with textile jobs alone beaten down by 70%.
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even greater threat to our nation’s economic productivity and prosperity: economic espionage.
Economic espionage occurs when a foreign power sponsors or
coordinates intelligence activity directed at another government, a
foreign corporation, establishment, or person.3 This intelligence activity is “designed to unlawfully or clandestinely . . . obtain sensitive
financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical technologies[,] or to unlawfully or
clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions.”4 An
employee’s unwitting act of opening an electronic attachment containing a malicious virus meant to infiltrate the company’s server or
a trusted insider who deliberately downloads his employer’s source
code for personal gain and for the benefit of a foreign entity can
harm the employer and may cost their company millions or even
billions of dollars.5
The term “economic espionage” sounds mysterious and perhaps
a bit “cloak and dagger.” One can imagine a covert foreign agent
tasked with committing economic espionage stopping by a dead
drop to retrieve a package containing the latest blueprints or prototype designs that a General Electric employee has left behind for his
handler. However, one who commits economic espionage needs no
covert moves to be successful.
In reality, economic espionage is merely a form of cheating—
stealing trade secrets from one company in order to assist a stateOther critical industries like chemicals, paper, steel, and tires are under similar
siege, while employment in our high-tech computer and electronics manufacturing industries has plummeted by more than 40%.” Id. at 2–3.
3
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ECON. ESPIONAGE,
PROTECTING AMERICA’S TRADE SECRETS, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage-1. Industrial espionage is similar to
economic espionage in that it involves the theft of trade secrets, however, industrial espionage does not involve a foreign power, instrumentality, or agent. Id. at
2.
4
The FBI Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions (last
visited Oct. 22, 2015) https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs.
5
“Cyber espionage is the science of covertly capturing e-mail traffic, text
messages, other electronic communications, and corporate data for the purpose of
gathering national-security or commercial intelligence.” Seymour M. Hersh, The
Online Threat: Should we be worried about a cyber war?, THE NEW YORKER,
Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/01/the-onlinethreat.
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sponsored foreign entity skip its research and development (R&D)
phase (or at least, accelerate the process) and proceed straight to
making money for its stakeholders and boost that country’s economy. What makes this form of cheating “espionage” is that typically, one foreign nation is deprived of its trade secrets while another
benefits from its neighbor’s sweat equity.
In 1996, the United States’ Congress determined that this is a
crime.6 Some nations agree, others condemn the activity but let the
civil courts handle these issues, and other nations condone it—all is
fair in love, war, and business.7 One nation’s political and military
ally can also be that country’s economic competitor/adversary at the
same time.
While the threat may sound exaggerated, it is not. Estimates
vary, but economic espionage costs the United States’ government
and the private sector somewhere between $2 to $400 billion annually.8 Symantec, an American technology security company, estimates that industrial espionage costs United States’ businesses more
than $250 billion each year.9 Others have calculated that cyber espionage, in particular, costs the U.S. economy from 0.1 percent to 0.5
percent of its gross domestic product.10
6

Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488.
Siobhan Gorman, China Singled Out for Cyberspying, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203
716204577015540198801540.
8
The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in 2009 that as much
as $50 billion was lost due to espionage, cyber attacks and other counterfeit and
trademark crimes. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC.,
FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE
2009-2011 (2011) [hereinafter COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT]. See also David
Cotriss, Blame Game: Cyber Espionage, SC MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.scmagazine.com//blame-game-cyber-espionage/printarticle/316384/.
9
Cotriss, supra note 8. See also MCAFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L
STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME (2014),
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf.
10
Ellen Nakashima, Obama Orders Voluntary Security Standards for Critical Industries’ Computer Networks, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-orders-voluntary-security-standards-for-critical-industries-computer-networks/2013/02/12/
e1d0a586-755e-11e2-8f84-3e4b513b1a13_story.html.
7
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During a Senate hearing in 2014, Representative Mike Rogers,
chair of the House Intelligence Committee and chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, stated that the theft of
proprietary information and technology constitutes “the largest
transfer of wealth . . . in the world’s history”11 and has cost the
The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property reports
that annual U.S. economic losses from international IP theft are “likely to be comparable to the current annual level of U.S. exports to Asia, [which is estimated at]
over $300 billion.” COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., THE IP
COMMISSION REPORT 2 (2013). “[F]ormed in 2012, [the Commission on the Theft
of American Intellectual Property is] ‘an independent initiative representing the
sectors of research, defense, academia, government, labor, and business. The
Commission is dedicated to examining the causes and impact of IP theft on U.S.
strategic and economic interests and recommending policy solutions to the Administration and Congress.’” Scott Bradner, IP Commission Report: Surprisingly
Clueful, NETWORK WORLD (May 30, 2013), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2166743/software/ip-commission-report--surprisingly-clueful.html. A threat
assessment statement from 2015 outlining the top risks to national security found
that dangers from foreign spies and from leakers “are increasing in frequency,
scale, sophistication, and severity of impact.” Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before Senate Armed Services Comm.,
114th Cong. 1–3 (2015) (statement for the record of James R. Clapper, Director
of National Intelligence), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf. According to Clapper’s statement,
the top threats in 2014 included: 1) cyberattacks, cyberespionage, 2) terrorism and
transnational organized crime, 3) Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, 4)
counterintelligence, and 5) counterspace (attacks on satellites, communications).
Id.
11
Hilary Tuttle, Counterintelligence Now Riskier than Terrorism, Intelligence Officials Report, RISK MANAGEMENT MONITOR (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/counterintelligence-now-riskier-thanterrorism-intelligence-officials-report/. An economist and director of the U.S.
Cyber Consequences Unit, a non-profit research institute, has said, “While a precise dollar figure for damage is elusive, the overall magnitude of the attacks is
not. We’re talking about stealing entire industries. This may be the biggest transfer of wealth in a short period of time that the world has ever seen.” Michael Riley
& John Walcott, China-Based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold
War, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-13/china-based-hacking-of-760-companies-reflects-undeclared-global-cyber-war. This is a common phrase used by those describing the impact of economic espionage. The cybersecurity “firm McAfee detailed hacks into some 72 public and private computer networks in 14 countries
[in a report in August 2011] and [also] warned of ‘the biggest transfer of wealth
in terms of intellectual property in history.’” Adam Piore, Digital Spies: The
Alarming Rise of Electronic Espionage, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 24, 2012),
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United States an estimated $2 trillion.12 One thing is certain, the
United States would stand to gain millions of jobs and see a dramatic
increase in GDP growth, R&D investment, and increased worker
productivity and innovation in a world where economic espionage
disappeared and a respect for intellectual property existed. Pens, papers, files, and document storage rooms are a thing of the past. We
currently live in an age of malware13, botnets14, rootkits,15 zero-

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/how-to/a7488/digitalspies-the-alarming-rise-of-electronic-espionage/.
12
See Tuttle, supra note 11. See also Ann. Open Hearing on Current and
Projected National Security Threats to the U. S.: Hearing Before Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 4–7, 12–14 (2014) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). This
threat assessment report outlines the top risks to national security. The report says
dangers from foreign spies and leakers have increased in frequency and severity.
13
Malware can be embedded on microchips purchased by a company and
used to exfiltrate information from computers. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–8
(2011) (statement of Gordon Snow, Assistant Dir., Cyber Div., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation).
14
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING
IN CYBERSPACE (Jul. 2011). “Botnets are networks of compromised computers
controlled remotely by an attacker. The botnets run by criminals could be used by
cyber terrorists or nation states to steal sensitive data, raise funds, limit attribution
of cyber attacks, or disrupt access to critical national infrastructure. Botnets that
specialize in data exfiltration are able to capture the contents of encrypted
webpages and modify them in real time. When properly configured, criminals can
ask additional questions at login or modify the data displayed on the screen to
conceal ongoing criminal activity.” Snow, supra note 13.
15
Thomas Brewster, Russians Suspected in ‘Uroburos’ Digital Espionage
Attacks, TECH WEEK EUROPE (Mar. 3, 2014, 11:24 AM),
http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/workspace/russian-intelligence-uroburosmalware-140494 (quoting Jaime Blasco, director of AlienVault Labs). A “root
kit” is a type of malware that “hides the presence of the spying operation and also
creates a hidden, encrypted file system to store stolen data and tools used by the
attackers. Those tools include password stealers, tiny programs for gathering information about the system and document stealers.” Id; Peter Apps & Jim Finkle,
Insight – Suspected Russian Spyware Turla Targets Europe, U.S., REUTERS (Mar.
7, 2014, 2:31 PM), uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/russia-cyberespionageidUKL1N0M302H20140307.

764

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:757

day,16 honeypots,17 cybercriminal threats, advanced persistent
threats (APTs)18 and computer network exploitation. It is relatively
easy for nation states to either steal trade secrets via the internet or
to find an insider who will steal it for them. These significant and
repeated threats should raise our ire and cause entrepreneurs to take
a second look at their electronic encryption process or personnel security measures. Yet surprisingly, most Americans remain either indifferent to this present and persistent threat, lulled into a false sense
of security due to the inadequate protective measures already in
place, or resigned to the possibility of technology loss through theft
as just another cost of doing business. Their concerns only become
truly real when it becomes personal, when it is their company trade
secrets that are looted.
Foreign competitors steal trade secrets in a variety of ways—
through targeting and recruiting insiders, conducting economic intelligence operations through the use of bribery, cyber intrusions,
theft, and dumpster diving in search of intellectual property or discarded prototypes, and establishing joint ventures with U.S. companies.19 Foreign competitors will also utilize unsolicited emails to tar-

16

Zero-day refers to a Windows software flaw that was used by Russian government-linked hackers to install malicious software to conduct a large-scale
cyber-spying program on NATO, U.S. government agencies, and European countries. Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa05ef7-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251_story.html.
17
Economic Espionage professionals defined “Honeypots” as “intelligence
operations in which a younger sexual partner is used to seduce and suborn a target
with access to secret information.” Susan Waterman, U.S. Defense Contractor
Arrested for Passing Secrets to Chinese ‘Honeypot,’ WASHINGTON TIMES (March
19, 2013) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/19/us-defense-contractor-arrested-passing-secrets-chi/?paige=all.
18
An “advanced persistent threat” is considered “an onslaught of computer
network intrusions originating from Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in China.”
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5. The Department of Defense
has characterized China as “the world’s most active and persistent perpetrator of
economic espionage.” Cotriss, supra note 8.
19
Economic Espionage And Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate For
Today’s Threats? Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Crime and Terrorism, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Coleman Statement]
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get insiders or plant a computer virus, establish front companies, liaison with universities that have ties to defense contractors, have
foreign intelligence agents attempt to recruit insiders, serve as hosts
or attendees at trade conferences, infiltrate research and facilities relocated overseas, circumvent export control laws, visit scientific and
research delegations, and of course, hack into private company databases.20
The United States government recognizes that economic espionage is a huge problem, so it has taken steps to combat and protect
against this threat. But are these protective measures sufficient to
thwart or mitigate the problem? Should the United States reverse
course and follow the path of other nations, which steal foreign intellectual property and share the pilfered trade secrets with their own
state-run industries and corporations? Or should we simply look the
other way like other countries appear to be doing? This article examines how various countries deal with the economic espionage
threat and how these measures compare to the U.S. response; it seeks
to explore how differences in national pride, cultural, historical and
nationalistic backgrounds, and economic and political governance
allow some countries to be unapologetic supporters of state-sponsored economic espionage. Part II evaluates the U.S. government
response and how other countries handle the issue of economic espionage, which countries have chosen to criminalize these acts and
which countries condemn but do not criminalize. Part III identifies
the leading offender nations and how cultural attitudes toward property rights and the type of political governance contribute to an acceptance of economic espionage. Part IV attempts to explain why
the overall global response to economic espionage is weak, why the
issue is more complicated than it seems at first glance, and why a
strong U.S. response is needed.

(statement of Randall C. Coleman, Assistant Dir. Counterintelligence Div., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation).
20
FBI NATIONAL PRESS OFFICE, FBI ANNOUNCES ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
AWARENESS CAMPAIGN (2015); Coleman Statement, supra note 19.
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II. GLOBAL SOLUTIONS TO COMBAT ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
A. The United States’ Response
The U.S. government is currently using a two-pronged approach
to combat economic espionage by: (1) preventing the thefts by educating and training private companies to improve security and safeguard their secrets, and (2) reacting to acts of economic espionage
by federally prosecuting offenders.21
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the leading agency
responsible for combatting economic espionage. In fact, counterespionage22 has become their number two priority second only to terrorism.23 Intellectual property theft not only costs businesses money,
but it is also considered a strategic threat—a threat to our nation’s
economic and security interests.24
21

See generally COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND
TRADE SECRET THEFT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND POLICY
RESPONSES (2013).
22
Counterespionage includes corporate counterintelligence, which is considered the reverse form of business espionage and business intelligence. Its main
purpose is to protect business information from those who are not authorized to
receive it, to counter potential threats, and to enhance security. See Steve Whitehead, Corporate Counterintelligence—Protecting Business Information,
COMPUTER BUS. REV. (June 1, 2013), http://www.cbr.co.za/regular.aspx?pklRegularId=1390.
23
“F.B.I. Director Robert Mueller designated espionage as the F.B.I.’s number two priority.” Investigative Programs Counterintelligence Division, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Last visited Nov. 3, 2015),
https://www2.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm. See also A New F.B.I. Focus: H.R.
Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. for the Dep’t of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter
Mueller Testimony] (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI),
https://www2.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/mueller062102.htm. “The Economic
Espionage Unit is dedicated to countering the economic espionage threat to include developing training and outreach materials; participating in conferences;
visiting private industry; working with law enforcement and intelligence community on requirement issues; and providing specific classified and unclassified
presentations.” Investigative Programs Counterintelligence Division, supra.
24
As noted during a hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime while discussing the Economic Espionage Act bill, “threats to the nation’s
economic interest are threats to the nation’s vital security interests.” H.R. REP.
NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996). Some, including former F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh,
have called economic espionage “the greatest threat to [the United States] since
the Cold War.” Alan Gathright & Vanessa Hua, Tech Theft Rises Amid China

2016]

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

767

The FBI continually organizes training sessions and initiates
working partnerships with the private sector to educate companies
and universities as to potential weaknesses in their security systems
whether these deficiencies be personnel and/or computer-related.25
Their strategy of reaching out to the private sector, participating in
seminars, round table discussions, making training films on the issue, and meeting with private industry stakeholders has been relatively successful in spreading the word as to damaging effects of
economic espionage. 26
Ties, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Techtheft-rises-amid-China-ties-Growing-2635355.php.
25
See COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 21. See also U.S.-CHINA
ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 113TH CONG., REP. TO CONGRESS (Comm. Print
2013),
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2013-annual-report-congress.
26
Economic Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and
Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H.R. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 16–19 (2012)
(statement of C. Frank Figliuzzi, Assistant Dir., Counterintelligence Div., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Figliuzzi Testimony].
“To address the evolving Insider Threat, the FBI has become more proactive to
prevent losses of information and technology. CD continues expanding our outreach and liaison alliances to government agencies, the defense industry, academic institutions, and, for the first time, to the general public, because of an increased targeting of unclassified trade secrets across all American industries and
sectors. On May 11, 2012, the FBI launched a media campaign highlighting the
Insider Threat relating to economic espionage. This campaign included print and
television interviews, billboards along busy commuter corridors in nine leading
research areas nationwide, and public information on the FBI Web site. Through
this campaign, the FBI hopes to reach the public and business communities by
explaining how the Insider Threat affects a company’s operations and educating
them on how to detect, prevent, and respond to threats to their organizations’ proprietary information. Perhaps the most important among these is identifying and
taking defensive measures against employees stealing trade secrets.” Id.
“In February 2013, the Bureau held the first session of our National Cyber Executive Institute, a three-day seminar to train leading industry executives on cyber
threat awareness and information sharing. One example of an effective publicprivate partnership is the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance, a
proven model for sharing private sector information in collaboration with law enforcement. Located in Pittsburgh, the alliance includes more than 80 industry partners from a range of sectors, including financial services, telecommunications,
retail and manufacturing. The members of the alliance work together with federal
and international partners to provide real-time threat intelligence, every day. Another initiative the FBI participates in, the Enduring Security Framework, includes
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Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act “(EEA)” in
199627 to much fanfare. The United States was tired of “the systematic pilfering of our country’s economic secrets by our trading partners which undermines our economic security”28 and wanted to
communicate that we, as a society, morally condemn this type of
crime—a crime that is punishable by a maximum of fifteen years in
prison.29 Prior to 1996, those stealing trade secrets were prosecuted
using a variety of different federal statutes, including mail and wire
fraud and the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property.30 However, the Supreme Court later ruled that trade secrets were not property, and thus, it was inappropriate to use the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property statute to prosecute a number of these
crimes.31 Therefore, when former President Bill Clinton signed the
Economic Espionage Act in 1996, it was the first time the FBI had
a specific criminal statute with which to fight this particular problem.
The statute has since been amended to increase the fines that can
be imposed, from $500,000 to $5 million in the case of an individual
and from $10 million to not more than the greater of $10 million or
three times the value of the stolen trade secret.32 This reflects Congress’ continued emphasis and focus on the severity of the crime.33
top leaders from the private sector and the federal government. This partnership
illustrates that the way forward on cyber security is not just about sharing information, but also about solving problems together.” Threats to the Homeland:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 7–9 (2013) (statement of James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau
of Investigation).
27
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, §101, 110 Stat.
3488 (1996).
28
142 CONG. REC. 14 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statements of Sen. Kohl &
Sen. Spector).
29
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012).
30
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
31
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 215–18 (1985).
32
Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442. (2013).
33
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ADMINISTRATION’S WHITE PAPER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/ip_white_paper.pdf [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER]. In
2011, the Administration recommended that “Congress increase the statutory
maximum sentence for economic espionage [from 15 to] 20 years.” In addition,
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Title 18 United States Code Section 1831 (EEA) makes it a
crime to knowingly steal or receive a trade secret for the benefit of
any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.34
The term “trade secret” is described as “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes whether tangible or intangible, and
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically or in writing.”35 Moreover,
in order to be considered a trade secret, the owner must have “taken
reasonable measures to keep such information secret” and the trade
secret must have an independent economic value.36 Trade secret examples include software, marketing plans, customer lists, source
the Administration asked Congress to direct the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
consider increasing the guideline range based on aggravated offense conduct in
theft of trade secret and economic espionage cases. Id. at 4–5
34

(a) In General.— Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will
benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign
agent, knowingly—
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret:
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates,
transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret:
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization:
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4), and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of conspiracy shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned
not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) ORGANIZATIONS. - Any organization that commits any offense
described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10,000,000.
Economic Espionage Act § 101, supra note 27.
35
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012).
36
Id. Therefore, a trade secret is different from a patent or copyright whereby
owners may sue under patent or copyright laws.
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codes, pricing information, technical drawings, and chemical formulas.37
A foreign agent is defined as “any officer, employee, proxy,
servant, delegate, or representative of a foreign government.”38 A
foreign instrumentality is defined as “any agency, bureau, ministry,
component, institution, or association, or any legal, commercial, or
business organization, corporation, firm, or entity, that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed or dominated by a foreign government.”39
The territorial limits of section 1831 are relatively broad. The
EEA protects against theft that occurs either in the United States or
outside the United States. If the theft occurs outside the United
States, the violator must be a U.S. person or organization or an act
in furtherance of the offense must have been committed in the
United States.40
Since 1996, there have been six convictions under Section
1831.41 On many occasions, an indictment was filed with a § 1831
charge included, but eventually the defendant pled guilty to a lesser
charge such as § 1832 theft of trade secrets.42 The following table
summarizes the six § 1831 convictions:43

37

Do I Have Trade Secrets to Protect?, MAX FILINGS (last visited Nov. 4,
2015), https://www.maxfilings.com/incorporation-knowledge-center/Trade-Secrets-to-protect.php.
Trade secrets are similar to trademarks, patents, and copyrights in that they are all
deemed intellectual property, however, trade secrets do not share the same protections as the other three. Patents, trademarks, and copyrights all give the owners/creators an exclusive right to their work to distribute, copy, perform, display,
modify, etc. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is Intellectual Property?, (last visited Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf.
38
18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012).
39
Id.
40
18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012).
41
A Look at 16 Years of EEA Prosecutions, LAW 360 (Sep. 19, 2012 at 12:18
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at-16-years-of-eea-prosecutions.
42
Id.
43
The author created this table by reading about these cases in the news. See
also Offices of U.S. Att’ys, Economic Espionage and Trade Secrets, 57 U.S.
ATT’YS BULL. (2009) and FBI, https://www.fbi.gov (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
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Year Case Name

Jurisdiction Case
Number
2006 United States Court of Ap- 436 F.3d
v. Fei Ye &
peals for the 1117 (9th
Ming Zhong Ninth Circuit Cir. 2006)
2006 United States Northern
v. Xiaodong District of
Meng
California

Company

Trade
Secret
NEC Electron- Microchip
ics; Sun Miblueprints
crosystems Inc.;
Transmeta Corporation
No. CR 04– Quantum3D,
nVSensor
20216
Inc.

Foreign Entity
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Country Sentence

Defendants’ pri- China
vately owned
Chinese company

1 year in
prison

Royal Thai Air Thailand, 24 months in
Force, Royal Ma- Malaysia, prison
laysian Air
& China
Force, & China’s
Navy Research
Center

2011 United States Court of Ap- 659 F.3d
v. Dongfan
peals for the 815 (9th
“Greg” Chung Ninth Circuit Cir. 2011)

Boeing

Aviation
China Aviation China
Technologies Industry Corp.;
The People’s Republic of China

188 months in
prison, and 3
years supervised release

2011 United States Southern
v. Kexue
District of
Huang
Indiana

2011 WL
6386398

Dow AgroSci- Biochemicals Chinese Univer- China;
ences; Cargill,
sity
Japan
Inc.

2011 United States District of
v. Elliot Doxer Massachusetts

No. 1:11- Akamai TechCR-10268 nologies, Inc.
(D. Mass.
Dec. 21,
2011)

Customer
Israeli Governand emment
ployee lists
and contact
information

Israel

2014 United States Northern
v. Walter
District of
Liew, & USA California
Performance
Technology,
Inc.

2014 WL
2586329

Titanium Di- Pangang Group
oxide
Limited Com(“TiO2,”
pany
used in
Oreo® Whitening Recipe)

China

87 months in
prison, 3 years
of supervised
release
6 months in
prison, 2 years
of supervised
release, and a
fine of
$25,000
15 years in
prison and a
fine of
$511,667.82

E.I. du Pont de
Nemours &
Company
(“DuPont)

Other criminal statutes have also been used in this area, to include theft of trade secrets (otherwise known as industrial espionage),44 mail or wire fraud,45 foreign or interstate transportation of
stolen property46, the Export Control Act47 and the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)48, money laundering,49 and the
44
Section 1832 makes it a crime to knowingly perform targeting or acquisition of trade secrets or intend to convert a trade secret to knowingly benefit anyone
other than the owner. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012).
45
18 U.S.C. § 1341, (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1343, (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2012).
46
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
47
22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012).
48
22 C.F.R. § 120. (2014).
49
18 U.S.C. § 1956, (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012).
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Fraud Scheme.50 Theft of trade secrets under § 1832 is easier to prosecute (hence the greater amount
of convictions compared to § 1831) due to the fact that no government sponsorship (beneficiary) need be proven and the maximum
sentence is ten years rather than fifteen years under § 1831. The
number of theft of trade secrets convictions increased by more than
sixty percent between 2009 and 2013.51
This reactive/prosecution part of the government’s two-pronged
strategy to combat economic espionage has had dismal results. The
extremely small number of prosecutions has made only a minor, insignificant dent in what is a huge, ongoing problem. 52
B. Other Nations’ Responses
While the United States remains the world’s leader in research
and development (R&D), and historically has been known for its
innovation and cutting-edge technology, it is certainly not the only
country to suffer from the consequences of economic espionage. In
fact, most developed or developing countries have also been targeted for technology theft. Many countries have a number of criminal or civil statutes that can be applied when their government or
private industry are victimized.53 However, no country has a criminal statute with the specificity of §§1831 and 1832, which criminalize the theft of corporate trade secrets with the exception of Canada
and New Zealand, but more countries are considering such legislation.54 Not surprisingly, most foreign countries have a poor track
record of successfully prosecuting acts of economic espionage.
50

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2012). Intrusion or hacking is criminalized under 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
51
Coleman Statement, supra note 19. This article does not touch upon the
civil trade secret enforcement statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1838, or the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.
52
“We’re about high school soccer now; we’ve spread out, we pass well, but
the bad guys are moving at World Cup speed, so we have to get better.” Scott
Pelley, FBI Director On Threat of ISIS, Cybercrime, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-james-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/.
53
See table of various countries with applicable criminal statutes infra.
54
See table of various countries with applicable criminal statutes infra. See
generally GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2014 YEAR-END FRENCH LAW
UPDATE 11 (2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014Year-End-French-Law-Update.pdf.
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The table below lists the various countries that have criminal
statutes that can be applied to theft of trade secrets or economic espionage-type crimes:55
Criminal
Statute

Year
Created

Argentina

Code Pen.
art. 159

1. Fines, which are adjusted
for inflation;
2. Imprisonment from one
month to one year; and possi- Any third party, so long
1994/Amen
bly, where relevant
as it causes harm to the
ded 1996
3. Legal disqualification victim.
from special professions
from six months to three
years.

Brazil

Lei 9.279

1. Unspecified fines; or
1996/Amen
2. Imprisonment for three Any third party
ded 2013
months to one year.

Yes

Canada

R.S.C. 1985,
c. O-5

1989/Amen 1. Imprisonment for no more
Any third party
ded 2001 than ten years.

Yes

China

Law of September 2, 1993, of
the
People’s
Republic
of
1. Unspecified fines;
China Against
2. Imprisonment for no less
Unfair Compe- 1993/Amen than three years, but no more
Any third party
tition (promul- ded 1997 than seven years; and possigated by Peoble
ple’s Republic
3. Administrative sanctions
of China Presidential Order
No. 10)

Yes

Country

55

Penalty

Benefit Requirement

Civil
COA

Yes

The author compiled this table by referencing the above mentioned statutes
as well as BRADLEY LIMPERT & OXANA IATSYK, LIMPERT: TECHNOLOGY
CONTRACTING: LAW, PRECEDENTS AND COMMENTARY § 2-3 (2008).
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France

Germany

Italy
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In cases where the act is committed concerning a database
maintained by the French
state that includes personal
data:
1. Fines not to exceed
€75,000 ($81,442.50); and
2. Imprisonment for five
years.
In cases where national defense is compromised:
1. Fines not to exceed
€100,000 ($108,590); and
Protection of
2. Imprisonment for seven
Trade Secrets
years.
through
IPR 1992/Amen In cases where infringer is
Any third party
and
Unfair ded 1996 employee:
Competition
1. Imprisonment of two
Law § 14
years; and
2. Fines of €30,000.
In all other cases:
1. Fines not to exceed
€45,000 ($48,865.50); and
2. Imprisonment for up to one
year.
Supplementary
sanctions
may be imposed at the
court’s discretion:
1. Deprivation of voting
rights;
2. Rights to be elected; and/or
3. Rights to be a guardian of
a child.
In cases where one is an employee or former employee of
the victim:
1. Unspecified fines; or
Act
Against
1909/Amen 2. Imprisonment for up to
Unfair Compeded 2013 three years.
tition §§ 15, 17
In cases where one is obligated to keep the trade secret:
1. Unspecified fines; or
2. Imprisonment for up to
two years.

Penal
Code,
1996
Arts. 622, 623

Any third party, or with
the intent of causing
damage to the entrepreneur.

In cases where one acquired
the secret through business:
1. Imprisonment for up to
three
years.
In all other cases:
Any third party
1. Fines between €100
($108.55)
and
€1000
($1,085.52);
or
2. Imprisonment for up to
three years.

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Russia
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1. Imprisonment with labor
for up to ten years; and/or
2. Fines not exceeding
Unfair Compe¥10,000,000 ($82,529.40). In
1991/Amen
tition Prevencases where one is an em- Any third party
ded 2004
tion Law § 23
ployee or former employee of
the victim, the penalty also
includes additional fines up
to
¥300,000,000
($2,476,332).
1. Imprisonment for up to ten
years; or
2. Fines up to ₩100,000,000
($89,703).
In cases where one is using
the secret in order to benefit a
foreign entity:
1. Imprisonment with labor
Unfair Compefor up to ten years; or
tition Preven2. Fines equivalent to the
1992/Amen
tion and Trade
amount ranging from not less Any third party
ded 2014
Secret Protecthan two times to not more
tion Act § 24
than ten times the amount of
the profit in property.
In all other cases:
1. Imprisonment with labor
for up to five years; or
2. Fines equivalent to the
amount ranging from not less
than two times to not more
than ten times the amount of
the profit in property.
1. Fines (which can include
amount of defendant’s income),
2. Imprisonment,
Civil Code, Art. 1990/Amen
3. Deprivation of right to of139(1)
ded 2014
fices, or
4. Deprivation of rights to engage in certain activities.
Penalties are heightened if infringer is employee of victim.

Disclosure of information not legally
available to third parties, including commercial, tax or banking secrets to any third party

Any external official
Federal Act of
Imprisonment not to exceed agency, foreign organiDecember 19, 1986/Amen
Switzerland
three years and/or a monetary zation, private enter1986 on Unfair ded 2014
penalty.
prise, or agents of
Competition
these.
1. Fines up to three times the
Trade
Secret 1996/Amen amount of actual damages, Infringer or any third
Taiwan
Act
ded 2013 2. Injunctions, and/or 3. Im- party
prisonment.
No
criminal
Any unauthorized third
UK
No criminal penalties
statute
party
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Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
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1. Fines not to exceed $5 million and/or
Foreign Entity
2. Imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years.

No

The countries that comprise the “Five Eyes,”56 an intelligence
alliance among the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, have varying ideas as to
what should be done about economic espionage—Canada and New
Zealand have similar criminal statutes to the U.S., the United Kingdom has previously considered passing such legislation, and Australia simply considers theft of trade secrets a civil matter.
1. CANADA
Canada has in place an almost mirror-image copy of the U.S.’
EEA.57 Richard Fadden, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, stated in a report presented to Canadian parliament
that state-sponsored espionage against Canada had reached “levels
equal to, or greater than those witnessed during the Cold War.”58
The report indicated that Canada’s “open society with strong international relationships and advanced industries such as telecommunications and mining—make it attractive to foreign intelligence
agencies.”59 “As a world leader in communications, biotechnology,
energy extraction technologies, aerospace and other areas, Canada
remains an attractive target for economic espionage.”60
56
These five countries jointly coordinate their signals intelligence and are
bound by the U.K./U.S. agreement to share such intelligence. The Five Eyes, Privacy International (last visited Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51.
57
“Use of trade secret for the benefit of foreign economic entity – every person commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association
with a foreign economic entity, fraudulently and without color of right and to the
detriment of Canada’s economic interests, international relations or national defense or national security (a) communicates a trade secret to another person, group
or organization; or (b) obtains, retains, alters or destroys a trade secret.” Security
of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5 (Can.).
58
Agence France-Presse, Canada’s Spy Chief: Espionage Has Reached Cold
War-Level, RAW STORY (June 14, 2011, 4:51 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/2011/06/canadas-spy-chief-espionage-has-reached-cold-war-level/.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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Canada has been targeted by both Russia and China. In 2012,
two Russian diplomats were expelled from Canada in connection
with an espionage case against a Canadian naval officer charged under the Security of Information Act, which accused the officer of
giving “a foreign entity” secret information between 2007 and
2012.61 The Security Act “carr[ies] a maximum penalty of life in
prison.”62 Both Russia and Canada have an interest in the Arctic Circle where companies are exploring and mining for gold, diamonds,
iron ore, lead, zinc, and uranium.63
That same year, Telvent Canada Ltd., an information technology
company catering to the energy industry, stated that attackers had
breached its internal firewall and security systems, installed malicious software, and had stolen project files related to a product that
helps energy firms merge older IT assets with more advanced “smart
grid” technologies.64 Chinese hackers were blamed for the breach.65
China also has mining exploration interests in the Arctic Circle.66
While Canada amended its Security of Information Act in
200167 to look incredibly similar to the United States’ EEA, Canada
has yet to complete such a prosecution under its laws.68
61

Russian Diplomats Left Canada Weeks Before Halifax Espionage Arrest,
NATIONAL POST (Jan. 20, 2012), [hereinafter Russian Diplomats], http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/russian-diplomats-left-canada-weeks-before-halifax-spy-mystery.
62
Id.
63
Id; David Ljunggren & Euan Rocha, Mineral-Rich Canadian Arctic Territory Poised for Major Developments, MINEWEB (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.mineweb.com/archive/mineral-rich-canadian-arctic-territory-poised-for-major-developments/.
64
Brian Krebs, Chinese Hackers Blamed for Intrusion at Energy Industry
Giant Telvent, KREBS ON SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2012), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/chinese-hackers-blamed-for-intrusion-at-energy-industry-giant-telvent.
65
Id.
66
Ljunggren & Rocha, supra note 63.
67
Section 19 of the Act makes it an offense for a person to “at the direction
of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign economic entity, fraudulently
and without colour of right” communicate a trade secret to another person, group
or organization or obtain, retain, alter or destroy a trade secret “to the detriment
of” Canada’s economic interests, international relations, national defense or national security. Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5 (Can.).
68
A thorough review of the Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O5 (Can.) indicates no convictions under Section 19 have occurred.
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2. NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand amended its Crimes Act in 2003 and made intellectual property/trade secret theft a crime in Section 230.69 The language used in Section 230, “taking, obtaining, or copying of trade
secrets,” looks similar to the United States’ theft of trade secrets offense under Section 1832.70 “The intent elements require intent to
obtain any pecuniary advantage or to cause loss to any other person,
and acting dishonestly and without claim of right.”71 Legislative history suggests that foreign economic espionage was a primary concern in passing the legislation.72 Despite its passage, its fate has gone
the way of Canada with Section 230 having been “little used” and
not used at all in the foreign economic espionage context.73 In fact,
one law professor in New Zealand, Anna Kingsbury, argues that the
problem could be dealt with in the civil legal system and that such a
crime only encourages protection, reduces competition, and inhibits
innovation and employee mobility.74 Kingsbury sees an economic
espionage crime as “based in an idea of inter-country competition
that does not fit well with contemporary understandings of the economics of trade and theories of comparative advantage.”75 Thus, in
a “global” marketplace, employees that steal trade secrets are actually assisting in competition and innovation on a “global” level.
New Zealand’s Section 230 has yet to be tested.
3. UNITED KINGDOM
In the United Kingdom (UK), “[t]here is no statute in English
criminal law that is specifically aimed at penalizing a person who
misuses another’s trade secrets.”76 Moreover, the crime of theft
69

Anna Kingsbury, Trade Secret Crime in New Zealand Law: What Was the
Problem and Is Criminalization the Solution?, 37 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 147, 149
(2015). “Section 230 of the Crimes Act 1961 as amended in 2003 provides for an
offence of taking, obtaining or copying trade secrets. The penalty on conviction
is imprisonment for up to five years.” Id.
70
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012).
71
Kingsbury, supra note 69, at 149.
72
Id. at 151.
73
Id. at 151–52.
74
Id. at 152.
75
Id. at 153.
76
3 HILARY PEARSON, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 39:19
(2014).
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would rarely apply, as confidential information does not fall within
the definition of “property.”77 “In the non-criminal context, however, English law [particularly breach of confidence] provides broad
and effective protection for trade secrets through a variety of available remedies. These remedies include: search and seizure orders,
injunctive relief, damages, accounting for profits, third party liability, constructive trusts over assets acquired as a result of the breach
and an order to reveal the source of the disclosed information.”78
One consultation paper created by the UK Law Commission recommended that the UK criminalize the theft of trade secrets and suggested that the discussion was forthcoming in Parliament:
We provisionally conclude that the main arguments in favour of
criminalizing trade secret misuse are as follows:
(1)
That there is no distinction in principle between the harm caused by such misuse and the harm
caused by theft;
(2)
That the imposition of legal sanctions is necessary in order to protect investment in research;
(3)
That civil remedies alone are insufficient to
discourage trade secret misuse (and would continue
to be insufficient if exemplary damages were made
more widely available), because many wrongdoers
are unable to satisfy any judgment against them; infringement of copyright and registered trademarks
but not the misuse of
(4)
That is inconsistent for the law to prohibit the
trade secrets; and
(5)
That criminalization would help to preserve
standards in business life.79

77

Id.; see Theft Act of 1968, c. 60, § 4 (Gr. Brit.).
BRADLEY LIMPERT & OXANA IATSYK, LIMPERT: TECHNOLOGY
CONTRACTING: LAW, PRECEDENTS AND COMMENTARY § 2-3(c)(i) (2008).
79
GREAT BRITAIN: LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE:
MISUSE OF TRADE SECRETS – A CONSULTATION PAPER 30 (1997).
78
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However, these suggestions were not acted upon. The UK also
proposed changes to the Serious Crime Bill in order to deter hackers
by increasing the penalty under the Computer Misuse Act to a life
sentence.80
4. AUSTRALIA
To date, Australia has not decided to follow the example set by
the United States and criminalize acts of economic espionage. Australia relies upon civil and contractual enforcement through “breach
of confidence” which has its roots in English law.81 Also, as a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), Australia has an international obligation
under Article 39(2) to protect undisclosed information that has commercial value because it is secret though it has no specific trade secret protection laws on the books.82
Gillian Dempsey, a lecturer at the Australian National University, argues that despite the lack of protection, Australia’s regulation
of trade secrets is not deficient.83 Dempsey tends to agree with her
New Zealand counterpart that “[i]n a modern economy, production
tends to be characterized by alliances between firms” in order to cut
down on R&D costs and therefore alliances and sharing with firms
“already possessing the requisite complementary knowledge” can
be an “efficient manner of solving a problem involving specialist
knowledge.”84 Criminalizing the theft of trade secrets may reduce
any incentive a company might have to cooperate and share with
others.85
Moreover, Dempsey argues that companies should be responsible for their own security interests and should not burden the government with these sorts of costs.
80

Lee Munson, Hackers Who Threaten National Security Could Face Life
Sentences, NAKED SECURITY (Oct. 24, 2014), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/10/24/hackers-who-threaten-national-security-could-face-lifesentences/.
81
Gillian Dempsey, Industrial Espionage: Criminal or Civil Remedies,
AUSTL. INST. CRIM., Mar. 1999, at 1, 3–4.
82
1 RICHARD GOUGH, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 2:2
(West 2014).
83
Dempsey, supra note 81, at 4.
84
Id. at 5.
85
See id.
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[T]o argue for criminalization would involve an implicit assumption that the interest of the firm is concurrent with the interest of society as a whole. The
costs of detection and policing are likely to be relatively higher in a criminal arena than in a civil
arena. . . . And the policing agency would have to
acquire sufficient experience and knowledge in information security and evidence gathering techniques in a market where such knowledge is at a premium.86
In Dempsey’s argument, only the company whose trade secrets
are being protected would benefit, and the rest of society, in contrast,
would suffer the “disastrous” consequences on “innovation and
competitiveness.”87
5. JAPAN
Japan is thoroughly aware of the economic espionage problem.
Nissan acknowledged it might have been hacked in April 2012 when
they detected the presence of a computer virus on their network, and
they believed user IDs and passwords had been transmitted to hackers who “were looking for intellectual property related to its EV
drivetrains.”88 “Japan’s Finance Ministry . . . uncovered evidence of
a major Trojan cyber-attack on its computer systems [in order to
steal confidential information in 2010 and 2011 that remained] undetected for almost two years.”89
In 2012, “three IT executives were arrested in Japan for . . . allegedly us[ing] Android malware to ‘earn’ themselves over 20 million yen90 from unsuspecting victims” that downloaded a video

86

Id. at 6.
Id.
88
Shane McGlaun, Nissan Gets Hacked, Target Could’ve Been Intellectual
Property, DAILY TECH (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.dailytech.com/Nissan+
Gets+Hacked+Target+Couldve+Been+Intellectual+Property/article24527.htm.
89
John Dunn, Japan’s Finance Ministry Uncovers Major Trojan Attack,
CSO ONLINE (July 24, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/711878/japan-sfinance-ministry-uncovers-major-trojan-attack.
90
Twenty million yen is equivalent to approximately half a million U.S. dollars.
87
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playing application.91 “Once downloaded and run, it would badger
the users by requesting them to pay a 99,800 yen (around $1,256)
fee every few minutes, in addition to stealing their personal data and
storing it on a remote server for future use.”92 Japan had recently
introduced a law that makes malware creation and distribution a
criminal act.93
Japan has taken several steps to improve its efforts to counter
industrial espionage. Prior to 2009, the government was required to
prove that the trade secret theft resulted in profits for a third party
beneficiary.94 Japan has since revised its Unfair Competition Prevention Law so that it need only prove that the person committing
industrial espionage took information from a company without permission.95 In 2014, the Japanese government formed a committee
made up of government and company executives to discuss ways to
prevent trade secret theft and improve communication between government investigators and private companies.96 Before this committee, there had been little coordination and information sharing between investigative authorities and companies, and investigators
were unable to start an investigation unless a company filed a complaint.97 Japanese executives are reticent to disclose any type of theft
as that would mean they would have to take full responsibility for
the loss and “reporting may cause further time commitments and
expenses.”98
It must also be said that Japan has been known to conduct its
own economic espionage. Japanese industry is promoted by its own
government; the Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI)
uses the Japan External Trade Office (JETRO) to collect economic

91

Zeljka Zorz, Six Arrested for Peddling Android Malware in Japan, NET
SECURITY (June 18, 2012), http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?
id=2147.
92

Id.
Id.
94
Gov’t Eyes Panel to Share Info on Industrial Espionage, THE DAILY
YOMIURI, Jan. 15, 2014.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
93
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and trade information.99 JETRO, interestingly enough, offers free
commercial space and free communications to foreign companies in
downtown Tokyo.100
6. LATIN AMERICA
Latin America has also been facing an upsurge in cybercrime.
According to a 2013 report by Trend Micro and the Organization of
American States (OAS), cyberattacks increased between “8 to 40
percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.”101 “A lack of cybercrime laws, economic challenges, and unpatched and unprotected
citizen machines make the region ripe for cybercrime—and the data
only represents a fraction of the cybercrime incidents there since few
incidents are even reported or detected.”102 “Attacks on critical infrastructure, [industrial control systems, and financial institutions]
are on the rise.”103
While Latin America may not have a history of intellectual property protection, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
have “paved the legal road with legislation aimed to protect industrial or commercial confidential information.”104
III. THE LEADING OFFENDERS OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
Some of those countries listed in the table that consider economic espionage a crime are also some of the greatest perpetrators
of trade secret theft. Many foreign intelligence services feed their
pilfered information to domestic companies, thereby giving them a
competitive edge over other foreign companies.105 “[T]he leading
99

U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT SECRETARIAT, REP.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 8 (Nov. 15, 2010)
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20102_en.pdf.
100
A Free Office in Tokyo, VENTURE JAPAN, http://www.venturejapan.com/fast-track-starting-business-6.htm.
101
Kelly Jackson Higgins, Threat Nuevo: Latin America, Caribbean Cybercrime on the Rise, DARK READING (May 3, 2013), http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/threat-nuevo-latin-america-caribbean-cybercrime-on-the-rise/d/d-id/1139676?.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See LIMPERT & IATSYK, supra note 78 § 2.3(b).
105
Cotriss, supra note 8.
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state intelligence threats [are said] to be Russia and China, based on
their capabilities, intent, and broad operational scopes.”106 However,
there are certainly other players waiting to take China and Russia’s
place.107
A. China
[T]here are two kinds of big companies in the United
States[: t]hose that have been hacked by the Chinese
and those who don’t know they’ve been hacked by
the Chinese.108
—FBI Director James Comey
China first enacted trade secret “protections” in 1993 with the
passage of Article 10 of the Unfair Competition Law, which prohibits businesses from the following:
a) obtaining the trade secret of the rightful party by
theft, inducement, duress or other illegal means; b)
disclosing, using or allowing others to use the trade
secrets of the rightful party obtained by illegal
means; or c) disclosing, using or allowing others to
use trade secrets in breach of an agreement or the

106
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before Senate Armed Services Comm., 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (statement for
the record of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC
_FINAL.pdf.
107
“A growing number of computer forensic studies by industry experts
strongly suggest that several nations—including Iran and North Korea—have undertaken offensive cyber operations against private sector targets to support their
economic and foreign policy objectives, at times concurrent with political crises.”
Id. at 1.
108
Pelley, supra note 52. China denies that it targets U.S. companies. “[PRC]
Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin reportedly said in a statement that
China’s rapid ascendancy in terms of its military and space achievements are not
down to cyber espionage but the ‘pioneering, innovative and devoted work’ of the
Chinese people.” Phil Muncaster, China Hits Back at U.S. Cyber Snooping Allegations, REGISTER (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/04/23/
us_china_spying_satellite/.
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confidentiality requirement imposed by the rightful
party.109
Criminal sanctions, which may include up to seven years of imprisonment, may be used if the following three elements are met:
“(a) gross violation of the rights; (b) serious circumstances; and (c)
a large amount of illegal income, with heavy losses being suffered
by the victim.”110
Despite these so-called protections, China aggressively pursues
foreign companies’ trade secrets and intervenes to support Chinese
businesses against foreign competitors. In fact, the National People’s Congress in 2011 approved a five-year economic plan which
mirrored most of the common targets of Chinese cyberspying: clean
energy, biotechnology, advanced semiconductors, information technology, high-end manufacturing, such as aerospace and telecom
equipment, and biotechnology, including drugs and medical devices.111 China also wants U.S. technology, in particular, to advance
their own military needs.112
In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest
economy.113 One of the main reasons the Chinese economy has
flourished is due to the fact Chinese companies have been able “to
skip over [or accelerate] costly and time-consuming R&D and bring
products to market using U.S. trade secrets, technology and IP.”114
China appears to use the vacuum cleaner approach—collect it
all. China has accounted for roughly 50 to 80% of all open economic
espionage and trade secret theft investigations in the United States
alone.115 Their common methods of economic espionage can be di-

109

See LIMPERT & IATSYK, supra note 78 § 2.3(e)(ii) (2008).
Id.
111
Riley & Walcott, supra note 11. See also KPMG INTERNATIONAL, CHINA’S
12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN: CONSUMER MARKETS 2 (2011), http://www.kpmg.com
/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-12th-FiveYear-Plan-Consumer-Markets-201104.pdf.
112
Cotriss, supra note 8.
113
Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Largest Economy, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2011, 1:38 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy [hereinafter China Overtakes Japan].
114
Cotriss, supra note 8.
115
COMM’N ON THEFT AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 10, at 15.
110
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vided into three categories: (1) hacking; (2) recruiting students, business executives, and insiders overseas to steal trade secrets; and (3)
stealing from businesses who choose to manufacture in or conduct
joint ventures with China.
1. HACKING AND THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
In the case of China, it is relatively easy to prove the EEA’s foreign government/instrumentality/agent nexus. In December 2011,
the Wall Street Journal reported that the Chinese military sponsors
most of the Chinese cyberspying.116 “The Chinese cyberspying campaign stems largely from a dozen groups connected to China’s People’s Liberation Army and a half-dozen nonmilitary groups connected to organizations like universities . . . “117
In May 2013, the Washington Post described a classified report
by the Defense Science Board, which listed more than 24 U.S.
weapon system designs the board determined were accessed by
cyber intruders.118 “[S]enior military and industry officials with

116

Siobhan Gorman, United States Homes In on China Spying, WALL STREET
J., (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020433
6104577094690893528130.
117
Id. “The Chinese government, primarily through the PLA and the [Ministry
of State Security], supports these activities by providing state-owned enterprises
information and data extracted through cyber espionage to improve their competitive edge, cut R&D timetables, and reduce costs. The strong correlation between
compromised U.S. companies and those industries designated by Beijing as ‘strategic’ industries further indicates a degree of state sponsorship, and likely even
support, direction, and execution of Chinese economic espionage. Such governmental support for Chinese companies enables them to out-compete U.S. companies, which do not have the advantage of leveraging government intelligence data
for commercial gain.” Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Modernization and
Cyber Activities: Testimony of Dr. Larry M. Wortzel Before the House Armed
Services Committee, 8 Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, 14 (2014).
118
Ellen Nakashima, Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs
Compromised by Chinese Cyberspies, WASH. POST (May 27, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/confidential-reportlists-us-weapons-system-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html.
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knowledge of the breaches said the vast majority were part of a widening Chinese campaign of espionage against U.S. defense contractors and government agencies.”119
“[C]yberspies hacked into the computer networks of POSCO,
the South Korean steel giant in July 2006. . . . the same month that
the steelmaker, the third largest in the world, initiated a takeover of
a large steel mill in eastern China.”120 Mandiant, a private security
firm, issued a report in 2014 called “APT1” that accused China’s
PLA of launching cyberespionage attacks against 141 companies in
20 industries through a group known as “PLA Unit 61398” operating mainly from Shanghai.121 “The PLA . . . passes such information
to Chinese companies . . . so they can rapidly increase their own
capabilities.”122
“[PLA] leaders have embraced the idea that successful war
fighting is based on the ability to exert control over an adversary’s
information and information systems. The PLA has placed computer
network operations in a unified framework broadly known as information confrontation and seeks to integrate all elements of information warfare, electronic and non-electronic, offensive and defensive, under a single command authority.”123

119

Id. The list included the Patriot missile system, the Aegis ballistic missile
defense system, the F/A-18 fighter, the V-22 Osprey multirole combat aircraft,
and the Littoral Combat Ship. Id.
120
Riley & Walcott, supra note 11.
121
Ellen Mesmmer, Chinese Government Still Sponsoring Cyber-Espionage,
says FireEye COO, CHANNELWORLD (Mar. 3, 2014), http://specials.channelworld.in/channel_news/chinese-government-still-sponsoring-cyber-espionage,says-fireeye-coo.
122
Rick Newman, China May Have Hacked Your Company, Too, YAHOO
FINANCE (May 20, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/china-hasprobably-hacked-your-company--too-175016269.html.
123
Press Release, U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage (March 8, 2012),
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/USCC%20Report%20%20Chinese%20Capabilities%20for%20Computer%20Network%20Operations%20and%20Cyber%20Espionage.pdf. “The Chinese military’s close relationship with large Chinese telecommunications firms creates an avenue for state
sponsored or state directed penetrations of supply chains for electronics supporting U.S. military, government, and civilian industry—with the potential to cause
the catastrophic failure of systems and networks supporting critical infrastructure
for national security or public safety.” Id.
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“Some Chinese hacker groups, including groups affiliated with
the PLA, will carry out their official missions during the day and
then hack for profit at night. Other hacking groups will come across
commercially valuable information as they carry out their official
espionage tasks, take it, and then sell it for a personal profit to Chinese firms. Economic espionage is a money making activity for the
PLA, and this increases the difficulty of bringing it under control.”124
“China’s leaders describe modernization of the PLA as essential
to preserving and sustaining what they view as a ‘period of strategic
opportunity’ to advance China’s national development during the
first two decades of the 21st century. China’s leaders see this period
as providing an opportunity to focus on fostering a stable external
environment to provide the PRC the strategic space to prioritize economic growth and development and to achieve ‘national rejuvenation’ by 2049.”125
2. STUDENTS AND INSIDERS
China’s “energetic espionage program . . . began with China’s
economic opening to the West in the early 1980s and moved into
cyberspace at least twelve years [ago.]”126 “In 1986, Deng Xiao
Peng established ‘Program 863,’ a sort of academy of sciences and
technologies charged with closing the scientific gap between China
and the world’s advanced economies in a very short period of time.
124
China’s Military Modernization and its Implications for the United States:
Hearing Before U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 113th Cong. 72–81
(2014) (statement of James A. Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow of Strategic
Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies) [hereinafter Lewis Statement].
125
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2014, i
(2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2014], http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. The PLA’s
“New Historic Missions” codified in a 2007 amendment to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Constitution are to “[p]rovide an important guarantee of
strength for the CCP to consolidate its ruling position”; “[p]rovide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategic opportunity for national development”; “[p]rovide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests”; and “[p]lay an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting
common development.” Id. at 16.
126
Lewis Statement, supra note 124, at 77–78.
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The 863 Program and its institutional derivatives not only sponsored
actual research, they also promoted the acquisition of advanced
technologies from other countries legally or illegally.”127 The PRC
uses its citizens studying and working abroad to collect trade secrets
and bring them back to the motherland.128
Deng Xiaoping once said, “[w]hen our thousands of Chinese students abroad return home, you will see how China will transform
itself.”129
In 2009, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission quoted testimony provided by former FBI Special Agent
I.C. Smith that:
The Ministry of State Security sometimes places
pressure on Chinese citizens going abroad for educational or business purposes and may make pursuit of
foreign technology a quid pro quo for permission to
travel abroad. However, this phenomenon of “entrepreneurial espionage” appears to be particularly
common among businessmen who have direct commercial ties with Chinese companies and who seek
to skirt U.S. export control and economic espionage
laws in order to export controlled technologies to the
PRC. In such instances, profit appears to be a primary motive, although the desire to “help China” can
intersect in many cases with the expectation of personal financial gain.130
The greatest attribute of Chinese scholars in the eyes of the PRC
is their vulnerability to the Communist Party’s control. If bribes and
127

William Pentland, Entrepreneurial Espionage—Made in China, FORBES
(Jan. 22, 2011,), http://blogs.forbes.com/williampentland/2011/01/22/entrepreneurial-espionage-made-in-china/.
128
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 111TH CONG., REP. TO
CONGRESS (Comm. Print 2009), [hereinafter U.S.-CHINA REP. TO CONGRESS
2009], http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2009-Report-toCongress.pdf. According to Chinese official’s statistics, in 2000 there were
190,000 PRC students in the United States. SUJIAN GUO AND BAOGANG GUO,
THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS 106 (Lexington Books, 2010).
129
Robert Lenzer, The China Hand, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2005),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/1031/079.html.
130
U.S.-CHINA REP. TO CONGRESS 2009, supra note 128, at 160.
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appeals to nationalism do not persuade students to spy for China,
coercion usually does. Beijing can easily coerce students to cooperate by threatening their visa status, tuition scholarships, future career, and even their families living in China.131
Insider “spies” are also comprised of a significant group of business executives who chose to steal trade secrets from their company
for monetary or ideological reasons. Much of the information stolen
is dual-use technology, which assists China in rapidly increasing its
military capabilities.132 In United States v. Chung, an insider’s interaction with the Western aviation-manufacturing firm, Boeing, provided a huge benefit to China’s defense aviation industry.133 Moreover, it is estimated that China has “over 3,000 front companies [operating] in the United States,” some with the sole purpose of facilitating technology transfer to China.134
3. JOINT BUSINESS VENTURES WITH CHINA
National industrial policy goals in China encourage intellectual
property (IP) theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese business
and government entities are engaged in this practice. “There are also
weaknesses and biases in the legal and patent systems that lessen the
protection of foreign [IP while] other policies . . . favor domestic
suppliers,” particularly in the technology field.135

131

Id. at 7, 12, 160–66.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2012,
at 10 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2012], http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf. “One of the PRC’s
stated national security objectives is to leverage legally and illegally acquired
dual-use and military-related technologies to its advantage. China has had a long
history of cooperation between its civilian and military sectors and openly espouses the need to exploit civilian technologies for use in its military modernization. In this context, the cumulative effect of U.S. dual-use technology transfers
to China could also make a substantial material contribution to its military capabilities.” Id.
133
United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011).
134
CARL ROPER, TRADE SECRET THEFT, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, AND THE
CHINA THREAT 81 (2014).
135
Eric Chabrow, Panel: Use Hack-Back to Mitigate IP Theft, BANK INFO
SECURITY (May 23, 2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/panel-hack-backor-sorts-to-shield-ip-a-5784.
132
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Since the 1980s, Chinese business partners have demanded that
some sort of technology transfer occur as part of every major business negotiation.136 “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been the
largest source of technology transfer for China.”137 “When western
aircraft companies create co-production facilities in China, they
teach Chinese workers how to build planes to western standards.”138
Any foreign company working within China or conducting business with China needs to understand that Chinese intelligence organizations and other state entities are behind the plots to steal their
technology.139 Chinese state-owned businesses are among some of
the largest firms in the world.140 The U.S.-China Economic Review
Commission Report of 2011 indicated that China’s privatization reforms have, in some cases, reversed gains by the private sector and
the state sector is strengthening.141 The state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the controlling
shareholder of some 120 state-owned firms, and the SASAC controls $3.7 trillion in assets.142 China’s state-owned enterprises receive a variety of benefits and include “preferred access to bank capital, below-market interest rates on loans from state-owned banks,
favorable tax treatment, policies that create a favorable competitive
environment for SOEs relative to other firms and large capital injections when needed.”143 “In fact, the state has the preponderance of
control over individual cyber rights. This permits the Chinese government to act freely regarding the management of information or

136

Lewis Statement, supra note 124, at 79–80.
Id. at 3.
138
Id.
139
Pentland, supra note 127.
140
U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N REPORT TO CONGRESS, 112TH
CONG., 44–45 (2011), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/annual_report_full_11.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-CHINA REP. TO CONGRESS
2011] (“In 2010, of 42 mainland Chinese companies listed in the Fortune Global
500, all but three were state owned. By revenues, three Chinese state-owned companies ranked among the top ten in the Fortune Global 500, compared to just two
American companies.”).
141
Id.
142
State Capitalism in China: of Emperors and Kings, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12,
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21538159.
143
U.S.-CHINA REP. TO CONGRESS 2011, supra note 140, at 2.
137
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its monitoring. The Chinese can establish their own rules for anything they claim to own.”144
Moreover, the theft of trade secrets is not only promoted by government policies and state-backed companies, but it also reflects the
societal attitude towards intellectual property. “One reason China
does not have a strong domestic software industry, for example, is
that no Chinese company can survive the wholesale pirating of its
products.”145 Microsoft estimates that only one out of every ten customers using its software in China is paying for it.146 But conditions
are improving.147 The percentage of pirated software usage in China
dropped to 77% in 2011.148
Guy Sorman, a French journalist who spent two years traveling
throughout China and interviewing various people, wrote:
Whether it’s electronics, garments, consumer durables, or cars, Chinese firms are content to assemble,
subcontract, or recopy. At times, they respect intellectual property, though generally it is ignored. Piracy is the norm. Enter any shop in China and you
can get the imitation of any Western luxury or electronic good at half the price. . . .
This has become a source of great concern for Western firms. Because this illegal trade is virtual, there
is no way of controlling it. The ingenuity of Chinese
piracy knows no bounds. In the summer of 2005, the
bookstores of mainland China were selling the seventh volume of the Harry Potter series even before it
had been written by its British author. In defense of
the Chinese counterfeiter, imitation is part of a long
144

Timothy L. Thomas, Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares,” 40
PARAMETERS 101, 111 (2010).
145
Lewis Statement, supra note 124, at 78–9.
146
Jon Brodkin, Ballmer to Hu: 90% of Microsoft customers in China using
pirated software, NETWORK WORLD (Jan 21, 2011 12:15 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2199038/software/ballmer-to-hu--90--of-microsoft-customers-in-china-using-pirated-software.html.
147
Cyrus Lee, Report: China’s Software Piracy Rate Falls to New Low – of
77%, ZD NET (May 17, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/reportchinas-software-piracy-rate-falls-to-new-low-of-77/.
148
Id.

2016]

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

793

tradition. As far back as the 1660s, the Spanish missionary Navarrete had observed that the Cantonese
artisans were “past masters in the art of counterfeiting, selling in China as the genuine article the fakes
they had copied from the West.”
. . . The concept of intellectual property has no meaning for Chinese producers, who see it as yet another
form of Western protectionism. There is a School of
Intellectual Property at the University of Shanghai.
Its director, responsible for educating future Chinese
entrepreneurs, says: “International brands are far too
expensive. Their high price excludes most of mankind from the benefits of the world economy.” In
other words, intellectual property is theft, and pirates
are philanthropists . . . .
Some may argue that Korea and Japan experienced a
similar phase before they managed to set up systems
and produce brands of international repute. China,
too, may replicate the same virtuous cycle. Such a
development does not seem likely in the near future,
however. China lacks innovation not because it is a
new economy but because its institutions do not foster the innovative spirit.149
B. Russia
While China uses various methods to steal foreign trade secrets
for both political and economic interests,150 Russia has recently focused its efforts on cyber espionage to promote its national economic interests, while also employing intelligence officers under

149
GUY SORMAN, EMPIRE OF LIES: THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 107–108 (Asha Puri trans., Encounter Books 2008).
150
Jim Finkle, Russia Hacked Hundreds of Companies, Says Security Firm,
REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:58 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/
1.569913. See also Piore, supra note 11 (“In the late 1980s, the German hacker
Markus Hess and several associates were recruited by the KGB to penetrate computers at American universities and military labs. They made off with sensitive
semiconductor, satellite, space, and aircraft technologies”).
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diplomatic cover.151 A U.S. cybersecurity firm, Crowdstrike, reported this past year that Russia has spied on “hundreds of American, European and Asian companies” to include “European energy
companies, defense contractors, technology companies . . . manufacturing and construction firms in the United States, Europe and the
Middle East as well as U.S. healthcare providers.”152
“Russia’s intelligence services are conducting a range of activities to collect economic information and technology from U.S. targets” in particular.153 Because Russia relies mainly on hacking to
accomplish its goals, it is much more difficult to prove which attacks
are government sponsored and where the source of the attacks originated.154 Foreign intelligence services, such as the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service (“SVR”), have used independent hackers as
proxies, thereby giving the agencies plausible deniability.155
151

The FBI estimates that approximately 25% of all diplomats in the United
States are intelligence officers or affiliated with a foreign intelligence service.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE, TRADE SECRET AND EMBARGO-RELATED CRIMINAL CASES (2015).
The Czech secret service, Security Information Service (BIS), released a report
this year stating that “[b]oth the Russian and Chinese embassy employ intelligence officers serving under diplomatic cover.” In 2013, the number of such officers at the Russian embassy was “extremely high” according to BIS. Jan Lopatka
& Catherine Evans, Czech Secret Service Sees ‘Extremely High’ Number of Russian Spies, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/27/us-czech-russia-espionage-idUSKBN0IG17B20141027 (quoting
the BIS report that stated “[r]ussian intelligence services attempted to make use
of both open and covert political, media and societal influence to promote Russian
economic interests in the Czech Republic”).
152
Finkle, supra note 150. The IT security firm Crowdstrike believes the Russian government is behind the activities of this Russian group, called “Energetic
Bear,” because of technical indicators as well as the analysis of the targets chosen
and the data stolen. See Eduard Kovacs, Russia Accused of Conducting Global
Cyber Espionage Campaign, SOFTPEDIA (Jan. 22, 2014, 9:30 AM),
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Russia-Accused-of-Conducting-Global-CyberEspionage-Campaign-419457.shtml.
153
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. See also Jason Ryan,
FBI Director Says Cyberthreat Will Surpass Threat from Terrorists, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/fbi-director-sayscyberthreat-will-surpass-threat-from-terrorists.).
154
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
155
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. In October 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin asked the new head of Russia’s external intelligence
service, Sluzhba Vnehny Razvedi (SVR), former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov
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Despite the fact that cyberattacks from Russia are a distant second to those from China,156 there have been a significant amount of
reports about the damage done by Russian malware. Hackers based
in Russia gained access to computers in NATO, Western European
governments, Ukrainian government organizations, energy and telecommunications companies in Europe, and U.S. academic institutions by utilizing a flaw in Microsoft Windows between 2009 and
2014.157 The vulnerability, dubbed “SandWorm,” was found in the
OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) package manager in Microsoft Windows and Server.158 In this case, “malicious Microsoft
PowerPoint files would make the OLE packager download additional malicious files that allowed the attackers to execute commands on the targeted systems.”159 The SandWorm hackers had
“been operating for at least five years and had been targeting institutions and individuals considered to work for Russian interests.”160
Russian government hackers were suspected in 2014 of creating
malware named “Uroburos” which could “move across machines
even if they were not connected to the public Internet” and were
designed to steal files from nation states’ infrastructure, intelligence
agencies, and high profile enterprises.161 “The Russian connection
was made after researchers from G-Data discovered plenty of Russian language strings in the code.”162 “They also found the malware
was searching for the presence of Agent.BTZ,163 malware used in
to build up the SVR’s economic espionage capabilities. Christopher Burgess, Nation States’ Espionage and Counterespionage, CSO (Feb. 13, 2008, 7:00 AM),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2122400/employee-protection/nation-states-espionage-and-counterespionage.html.
156
Burgess, supra note 155.
157
Russia used Windows flaw to spy for years: Researchers, PHYSORG (Oct.
14, 2014), http://phys.org/news/2014-10-russia-windows-flaw-spy-years.html.
158
Zeljka Zorz, Russian Espionage Group Used Windows 0-Day to Target
NATO, NET SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.net-security.org/secworld
.php?id=17491.
159
Id.
160
Id. See generally Briefings – August 5–6, BLACK HAT, https://www.blackhat.com/us-15/briefings.html.
161
Brewster, supra note 15.
162
Brewster, supra note 15.
163
Agent.BTZ was used in a massive cyber espionage operation on U.S. Central command that surfaced in 2008 and is one of the most serious U.S. breaches
to date. Brewster, supra note 15.
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attacks on the U.S. in 2008, which were said to have been carried
out by Russian spies.” “The Agent.BTZ attack was initiated when a
USB stick was deliberately left in a parking area belonging to the
United States Department of Defense” for an unwitting employee to
discover and use.164
Others have been troubled not by Russian hackers, but by the
rise of the Russian-based Kaspersky Lab. Kaspersky Lab sells antivirus and internet security software to millions of people worldwide
with Microsoft, Cisco, and Juniper Networks all embedding
Kaspersky code into their products.165 Each time a user downloads
an application onto their desktop, data is sent to the company’s Moscow headquarters.166 Eugene Kaspersky, its CEO, is one of Russia’s
richest men and was KGB-trained, used to be a Soviet intelligence
officer, and is currently aligned with Vladimir Putin’s regime and
Russia’s Federal Security Service.167
According to its “State Armament Plan 2011–2020,” the Russian government decided to reorganize and modernize its entire military and has already tripled its defense budget to the equivalent of
just over $700 billion U.S. Dollars.168 “As a result of Russia’s modernization initiative, government-funded entities are increasing their
footprint in the United States by seeking joint ventures with U.S.
companies and academic institutions that possess sensitive R&D facilities, dual-use (commercial and military) technologies, sensitive
proprietary information and classified technologies . . . saving the
Russian government millions of R&D dollars.”169

164

Brewster, supra note 15.
Noah Shachtman, Russia’s Top Cyber Sleuth Foils U.S. Spies, Helps Kremlin Pals, WIRED (July 23, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/07/
ff_kaspersky/all. Eugene Kaspersky has 300 million customers. His geek squad
uncovers U.S. cyberweapons like stuxnet and flame. And he has deep ties to the
KGB in Moscow. Id. See also Eugene Kaspersky Chairman and CEO of
Kaspersky Lab, KASPERSKY LAB, http://usa.kaspersky.com/eugene-kaspersky.
166
Shachtman, supra note 165.
167
Id.
168
Franz-Stefan Gady, Russia’s Military Spending to Increase Modestly in
2016, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 10, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/russiasmilitary-spending-to-increase-modestly-in-2016/.
169
Joint Venture- an Opportunity to Lose, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP NEWSLETTER (FBI, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2013 at 6.
165
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In June 2010, eleven SVR officers were arrested for illegally exporting high-tech microelectronics from the United States to Russian military and intelligence agencies.170 “The microelectronics allegedly exported to Russia are subject to strict government controls
due to their potential use in a wide range of military systems, including radar and surveillance systems, [weapons] guidance systems,
and detonation triggers.”171 Alexander Fishenko, founder and CEO
of Arc Electronics, Inc., a company claiming to produce technology
for traffic lights and navigation systems, “was also charged with operating as an unregistered agent of the Russian government inside
the United States by illegally procuring the high-tech microelectronics on behalf of the Russian government.”172
“In the Soviet Union there was no statutory form of trade secrets
protection.”173 However, the Russian Criminal Code was amended
in 2014 to grant such protection.
C. France
France is one country that seems to be at peace with the idea that
nations can be economic competitors in the global marketplace even
if politically aligned on other interests.174 Industry and government
are intricately intertwined in France. During a German television interview, France’s former General Directorate for External Security
(DGSE),175 Director Claude Silberzahn, admitted publicly that for
“decades” France has engaged in economic spying on behalf of

170
The indictments were against a Russian agent and 10 other members of
procurement network for Russia military and intelligence, operating in the United
States and Russia. Designated by the Department of Commerce, defendants also
included Texas and Russia based corporations. The Department of Commerce
also designated 165 foreign persons and companies who received, transshipped,
or otherwise facilitated the export of controlled commodities by the defendants to
its “Entity List.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Russian Agent and 10 Other Members of Procurement Network for Russian
Military and Intelligence Operating in the U.S. and Russia Indicted in New York
(Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Russian Indictment Press Release].
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
See LIMPERT & IATSYK, supra note 78 § 2-3(d)(i).
174
HEDIEH NAHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 13
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
175
The DGSE is France’s external intelligence agency.
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state-owned industries.176 He stated that in France, “the state is not
just responsible for lawmaking, it is in business as well.”177 “It has
been widely reported that France, for example, routinely bugged Air
France flights and French hotel rooms to obtain economic and technical information from selected foreign passengers and guests.”178
Pierre Marion, another former DGSE Director, also admitted in a
1991 NBC news interview that he implemented an economic espionage campaign targeting American companies in the early 80s.179
“France is the Empire of Evil in terms of technology theft, and
Germany knows it,” said Berry Smutny, head of German satellite
company OHIB Technology, in a 2009 diplomatic cable.180 The
communique, leaked in 2011, discussed rival contracts for a satellite
navigation system. Smutny was suspended after the cable became
public.181
Currently, Art. 418 of the French Criminal Code prohibits the
theft of manufacturing secrets,182 and “[l]ike Swiss and German law,
French law recognizes a specific crime for the communication of
trade secrets to foreigners or abroad.”183 France has proposed new
legislation or changes to its existing laws in order to help mitigate

176

F. W. RUSTMANN, JR., CIA, INC.:
OF BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE (2002).
177

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND THE CRAFT

“As former French intelligence chief Pierre Marion pointed out, ‘it is an
elementary blunder to think we’re allies. When it comes to business, it’s war.’”
NASHERI, supra note 174.
178
CHARLES MITCHELL, A SHORT COURSE IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
ETHICS 128 (World Trade Press, 3rd ed. 2009).
179
French Have Been Spying on U.S. Businesses, NBC Says, DESERET NEWS
(Sept. 14 1991 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/182953/
FRENCH-HAVE-BEEN-SPYING-ON-US-BUSINESSES-NBCSAYS.html?pg=all.
180
Adam Piore, The Secret War, Popular Mechanics, Feb. 2012 at 21, 23;
Joshua Norman, WikiLeaks: France Leads Russia, China in Industrial Spying in
Europe, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wikileaksfrance-leads-russia-china-in-industrial-spying-in-europe/.
181
Piore, supra note 180, at 23.
182
A manufacturing secret is “a manufacturing process which has a practical
or commercial interest and which the manufacturer keeps hidden from its competitors.” See LIMPERT & IATSYK, supra note 78 § 2.3(c)(iv).
183
Id.
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the effects of economic espionage.184 “France is also considering a
public economic intelligence policy and a classification system for
business information.”185 “France created a 12-person Economic Intelligence Office in 2009 to coordinate French corporate intelligence
efforts.”186
D. India
India suffers from incredibly lax laws on spying and intellectual
property theft. According to one report, “private detective agencies
[in India] receive more than 10 requests a day by companies to spy
on their rivals.”187 A survey by KPMG showed that 14 percent of
Indian companies have been victims of corporate spying, with many
companies not willing to admit intellectual property had been stolen.188
Cyberattacks coming out of India appear to be a new hybrid of
sorts because Indian hackers are taking some of their cues from Chinese hackers. For the last few years, a diverse cyberespionage campaign has grown out of India that has targeted a variety of industrial
entities around the globe, mainly Pakistan and U.S. organizations as
well as the Norwegian telecom provider, Telenor, and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.189 Researchers from Norman Security reported on “the so-called Operation Hangover campaign that security

184

TRADE SECRETS, supra note 1 at B-3; GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP,
2014 YEAR-END FRENCH LAW UPDATE 11 (2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Year-End-French-Law-Update.pdf.
185
TRADE SECRETS, supra note 1 at B-3.
186
TRADE SECRETS, supra note 1 at B-3.
187
Corporate Spying a Booming Business in India, REDIFF (May 17, 2011),
http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-corporate-spying-abooming-business-in-india/20110517.htm.
188
Jason Overdorf, Industrial Espionage Booming in Corporate India,
GLOBALPOST: MONEY (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/india/101223/industrial-espionage-corporate-india.
189
Kelly Jackson Higgins, ‘Commercialized’ Cyberespionage Attacks Out of
India Targeting United States, Pakistan, China, And Others, DARK READING
(May 20, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/commercialized-cyberespionage-attacks-ou/240155245; Alex Cox, Don’t Fear the
Hangover – Network Detection of Hangover Malware Samples, RSA – SPEAKING
OF SECURITY (May 20, 2013), https://blogs.rsa.com/dont-fear-the-hangover-network-detection-of-hangover-malware-samples/..
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experts say appears to be run by an independent cyberespionage organization-for-hire organization and demonstrates the vast and potentially lucrative nature of cyberspying in the global market.”190
“The group behind Operation Hangover appears to represent a
new advanced persistent threat (APT) model” and “possibly implicates a commercial Indian security firm”, thus Indian governmentsponsorship has not been confirmed.191 “Unlike the constant and
ubiquitous wave of cyberespionage attacks against U.S. interests by
China, Operation Hangover has more global and for-hire characteristics,” which makes it more difficult to determine “whether the operation is a nation-state endeavor.”192
E. Israel
A recently revealed NSA document, among many disclosed by
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, shows Israel to be a valued and trusted military ally, but also a country that spies on the U.S.
and targets U.S. technology.193 The NSA document quoted from a
2013 National Intelligence Estimate on cyber threats which “ranked
Israel the third most aggressive intelligence service against the U.S.”
behind only China and Russia.194 Two reports by Newsweek, published in May 2014, on Israeli spying also alleged that the extent of
Israeli espionage activities in the U.S. was “sobering” and “shocking.”195 According to a 2005 FBI report, Israel has an active program

190

Higgins, supra note 189.
Id.
192
Higgins, supra note 189. “Hangover appears to be a more ‘standardized’
or franchised operation, with freelancers writing code and regular patterns of establishing domains and placing images on them.” Snorre Fagerland, the principal
security researcher in the malware detection team at Norman Security’s Shark
team says, “[i]t’s like one of the call centers of the APT . . . There are indications
to some extent that the attack may be contracted—it might be a service provided
to somebody.’” Id.
193
Jeff Stein, Israel Flagged as Top Spy Threat to U.S. in New Snowden/NSA
Document, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/israel-flagged-top-spy-threat-us-new-snowdennsa-document-262991. See also
GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE (2014).
194
Stein, supra note 193.
195
Times of Israel Staff, New NSA Document Highlights Israel’s Espionage
in the U.S., TIMES OF ISRAEL (May 17, 2014, 8:38 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/new-nsa-document-highlights-israeli-espionage-in-us/.
191
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to gather information from within the U.S., which includes recruitment of spies and computer intrusion.196 “These collection activities
are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems
and advanced computing applications that can benefit Israel’s armaments industry.”197 One way Israel recruits spies is by encouraging
Israeli representatives and businessmen to attend conferences and
defense contracting facilities.198 The idea is to entice American scientists to visit Israel in order to obtain U.S. military and civilian
technologies.199
One such American scientist, Stewart David Nozette, worked at
the White House on the National Space Council before being convicted in 2011 for spying for Israel.200 Nozette is speculated to have
been compensated at least $225,000 for handing over classified information to Israel.201 The Office of Naval Investigations later
learned that Israel sold these U.S. trade secrets to other countries.202
One such trade secret was Phalcon, an early warning aircraft based
on U.S. licensed technology, which Israel attempted to sell to China
in 2000.203 Israel also “sold advanced weapons systems to China that
incorporated technology developed by American companies—including the Python-3 air-to-air missile and Delilah cruise missile.
There is evidence that Israel stole Patriot missile avionics to incorporate into its Arrow system and that it used US technology obtained

196
Philip Giraldi, Questioning Military Aid to Israel, Press Briefing sponsored
by the Council for the National Interest (June 8, 2011) (transcript available at http://ariwatch.com/OurAlly/IsraeliMilitaryAndIndustrialEspionage.htm).
197
Id. at 2.
198
Jeff Stein, Israel’s Aggressive Spying in the U.S. Mostly Hushed Up,
NEWSWEEK (May 8, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/israels-aggressive-spying-us-mostly-hushed-250278.
199
Id.
200
Giraldi, supra note 196, at 3.
201
Giraldi, supra note 196, at 3.
202
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., NCIX 2006-009,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE (2005).
203
Wade Boese, Israel Halts Chinese Phalcon Deal, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 1, 2000), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_09/israelsept00.
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in its Lavi fighter development program—which cost the US taxpayer about $1.5 billion—to help the Chinese develop their J-10
fighter.”204
The recruitment of U.S. citizens for Israel’s spy service does not
end with scientists. Pentagon intelligence analyst, Lawrence Franklin, gave classified materials to an Israeli Embassy intelligence officer, as well as American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
officials, and is consequently serving a twelve-year prison sentence.205 Israel also sent citizens posing as art students to U.S. military bases with the intention of gaining physical entry to government
offices, residences of government employees, and Defense Department facilities.206 Many of these “students” were found entering federal buildings from back doors and parking garages, and most of the
students had backgrounds in “military intelligence, electronic surveillance intercept, or explosive ordinance units.”207
IV.

AN EVALUATION OF THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE

A. Why the U.S. response has been weak
There are several reasons why the U.S. approach to combatting
economic espionage is weak: (1) the criminal statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1831, has requirements that are difficult to prove, (2) the sentences
under § 1831 are minimal, (3) despite being educated on the pitfalls
of lax cybersecurity and personnel controls, there is a lack of buy-in
from private industry to cooperate with law enforcement and/or
tighten office security measures to prevent IP theft, (4) the federal
government has taken a relatively hands-off approach in assisting
private enterprise, and (5) other countries do not assist in international investigations due to their own weak response or individual
204

Giraldi, supra note 196, at 1.
David Johnston, Pentagon Analyst Gets 12 Years for Disclosing Data, N.
Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/politics/20cndfranklin.html?_r=0.
206
Christopher Ketcham, The Israeli “Art Student” Mystery, SALON (May 7,
2002, 3:12 PM), http://www.salon.com/2002/05/07/students/.
207
Philip Giraldi, The Spy Who Loves Us, INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE,
(Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article20065.htm.
205
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attitudes towards intellectual property theft or in some cases, are the
same foreign countries involved in the theft.
1. THE WEAKNESSES IN 18 U.S.C. § 1831
There are several reasons why there have been few economic
espionage convictions under § 1831, one being the statute itself. The
EEA contains a difficult element to prove, that is, the foreign government/agent/instrumentality nexus requirement. The government
must prove that the defendant knew or intended that his actions
would benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.208 As
Thomas Reilly, a trial attorney in the Counterespionage Section of
the National Security Division writes,
The purpose behind the expansion of the intended
beneficiaries beyond foreign governments and foreign agents is to preclude evasion of the statute by
foreign governments hiding behind corporate or
other shell entities. An analysis of proof regarding a
foreign instrumentality requires a lot of investigation
into the structure, function, operation, personnel, and
conduct of the instrumentality and its business and
relationship with the foreign government . . . This evidence comes in many forms, primarily from a defendant’s own statements and documents, a money
trail, public records, a mutual legal assistance treaty,
letters rogatory, evidentiary requests, and expert witnesses who can explain the relationship among foreign entities and how the foreign government can
benefit from the offense.209
Proving government sponsorship is particularly difficult when
states “build relationships with hackers to develop customized malware or remote-access exploits to steal sensitive US economic or
technology information, just as certain FIS (foreign intelligence services) have already done.”210 “FIS and other foreign entities have
208

18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012).
Thomas Reilly, Economic Espionage Charges Under Title 18 U.S.C. 1831:
Getting Charges Approved and the “Foreign Instrumentality” Element, 57 U.S.
ATT’YS BULL. 24 (2009).
210
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at ii.
209
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used independent hackers at times to augment their capabilities and
act as proxies for intrusions, thereby providing plausible deniability.”211 Oftentimes, cybersecurity firms can determine the source of
the hack from the IP range and the particular language of the hacker
code. Chinese attacks are known to be constant and persistent, and
they come from several hackers in one giant, steady stream rather
than from one hacker, making it difficult to determine if the attack
is government sponsored.
Proof of government sponsorship in the case of China is easier
to find than with many other countries that attempt to install layers
of protection between those stealing the secrets and any government
entity.212 The central government in China has been linked to many
Chinese commercial entities, and those entities have been “affiliated
with PLA [“the People’s Liberation Army”] research institutes or
have ties to and are subject to the control of government organizations such as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.”213
A common defense to economic espionage and theft of trade secrets is to attack the statutory requirement that the information stolen
was, in fact, a “trade secret,” one which the owner took reasonable
measures to keep the information secret and one that has independent economic value.214 If the defendant can prove that the information was in the public domain or dispute the ownership of the
information, the defendant may not be convicted.215
Another common defense is for the defendant to allege reverse
engineering, which means that the beneficiary did not receive stolen
trade secrets, but rather others were able to conduct research and
analyze the product or information and determine how it worked or

211

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2014, supra note 125, at 13 (“China has
used its intelligence services and other illicit approaches to collect sensitive U.S.
information and export- controlled technology in violation of U.S. laws and export controls” to gain access to information they cannot access under the guise of
civilian enterprise).
213
Id.
214
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2012).
215
Thomas Dougherty, Common Defenses in Theft of Trade Secret Cases, 57
U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 27, 31 (2009).
212
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how it was made or manufactured on their own.216 In these situations, the government must attempt to show that “the defendant obtained the trade secret information without the authorization of the
trade secret owner.”217
The defense most commonly used is the “tool kit” defense, in
which the government fails to prove that the defendant intended to
share proprietary information with someone other than the owner of
the trade secrets. 218 The defendant alleges that he/she merely wanted
to download information at work for their own personal knowledge
for future personal use.219 This defense goes to the heart of a necessary element of prosecution that the defendant intended to convert
the trade secrets to the economic benefit of someone other than the
owner. It is difficult to prove this element if the defendant downloaded his or her own work so that he/she could use the non-confidential information in the future, and confidential information was
inadvertently transferred along with non-confidential information.220
The U.S. government has made some improvements to the statute since the EEA was passed in 1996 to make it easier to prosecute
these cases. Initially, federal prosecutors working under a U.S. Attorney would first seek approval to open an EEA investigation from
the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division of
the Department of Justice before charging anyone with economic
espionage.221 Recently, authorization to initiate EEA cases has been
216
Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) and
ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2006)).
217
Id. at 32.
218
See id. at 27 (citing theft of trade secrets case, United States v. Shiah, No.
SA CR 06-92, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11973 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008)).
219
See id. at 28 (illustrating a case where “[t]he court found that the defendant’s actions were consistent with his explanation that he compiled a “tool kit” of
information in downloading the body of his work at his place of employment so
that he could use the nonconfidential information in the future”).
220
Dougherty, supra note 215, at 28 (illustrating a case where the government
failed to prove the defendant downloaded the content for use of the confidential
information because the defendant testified that he only intended to use the nonconfidential information and downloaded the confidential information inadvertently).
221
Reilly, supra note 209, at 24. Until 2011, 28 C.F.R. § 0.64-5 (2015) set
forth the requirement that the Attorney General, Deputy General, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, or the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
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streamlined. It is unclear whether the decrease in red tape will have
a significant impact in the rise or decline of open economic espionage cases. Several suggestions to improve the ease of prosecution
under the EEA have arisen to include enacting a companion federal
civil cause of action,222 proposing both civil and criminal penalties
for the failure to report the theft and establishing a whistleblower
defense to encourage parties to report suspected thefts,223 focusing
on corporate accountability and employee awareness rather than
prosecution,224 and more carefully calibrating the EEA to the important societal IP interests at stake.225
2. LACK OF PUNISHMENT UNDER 1831
Federal judges have been less than uniform in their opinions and
views on economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and the penalties that should be meted out for those offenses. One judge sent a
definitive message to China by giving one Chinese spy, Greg
Chung, nearly 16 years’ imprisonment and exclaimed at the sentencing, “[s]top sending your spies here.”226 In another theft of trade secret case in Tennessee, the district court felt the circumstances did
not warrant incarceration and gave both defendants four months’
home confinement and a $1,000 fine.227
Division must provide personal approval in order for the United States to file a
charge under EEA.
222
Kelley Clements Keller & Brian M.Z. Reece, Economic Espionage and
Theft of Trade Secrets: The Case for a Federal Cause of Action, 16 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 1, 3–4 (2013).
223
David Orozco, Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of National Security-Related Technology Thefts, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 877,
881–82 (2013).
224
Brittani N. Baldwin, Keeping Secrets: An Alternative to the Economic Espionage Penalty enhancement Act, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 45, 46
(2013).
225
Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the Information Age: Upgrading
the Economic Espionage Act After United States v. Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON
REG. 189, 191–92 (2013).
226
Judge Carney at the sentencing hearing of Greg Chung on Feb. 8, 2010
where Chung was sentence to 188 months imprisonment. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal. Release No. 10-027, Former Boeing Engineer
Sentenced to Nearly 16 Years in Prison for Stealing Aerospace Secrets for China
(Feb. 8, 2010).
227
In late 2011, the company announced that MESNAC Co. of China was
taking a 100 percent equity position. Bill Brewer, Wyko Tire Technology Sold to

2016]

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

807

Federal judges have shown a distinct bias in handing out minimal sentences for economic espionage or intellectual property theft
compared to cases dealing with “typical” espionage, i.e., theft of unclassified intellectual property versus classified information. The
penalty for espionage can be death or life in prison,228 whereas economic espionage and theft of trade secrets provide maximum penalties of 15 and 10 years respectively.229 Spies who steal classified
secrets frequently receive maximum sentences under the guidelines,
whereas spies who steal trade secrets receive light sentences under
the guidelines, typically a few years or substantially less. The table
below reflects the disparity in sentencing in cases involving spies
who steal classified information working on behalf of a foreign
power, compared to the light sentences handed out to defendants in
cases dealing with theft of trade secrets.230 Either federal judges are
unaware of the dire ramifications of economic espionage to national
security, or they believe theft of trade secrets is less heinous and
more defensible than traditional espionage.

China Co., KNOXVILLE NEW SENTINEL (Dec. 1, 2011, 8:00 PM),
http://www.knoxnews.com/business/wyko-tire-technology-sold-to-china-company. Clark Roberts and Sean Howley were arrested March 6, 2009. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Two Indicted for Conspiring
to Steal Trade Secrets from Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Mar. 6, 2009).
They were both convicted on December 9 2010 for one count of conspiracy to
commit trade secret theft, one count of trade secret theft, one count of unlawful
photographing of trade secrets, three counts of transmittal of trade secrets, one
count of possession of trade secrets, two counts of wire fraud and one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of
Public Affairs, Two Engineers Found Guilty of Stealing Goodyear Trade Secrets
(Dec. 9, 2010). The District Court sentenced both men to four years probation,
four months home confinement, and 150 hours of community service. See United
States v. Howley, 707 F.3d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 2013). On June 3, 2013, Howley
and Roberts were resentenced to four years probation and 150 hours of community service. Both men, who were originally sentenced in 2011, have already completed community service. Howley and Roberts also served four months home
confinement as part of their original sentence, and paid a $1,000 penalty.
228
18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
229
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2012).
230
See table for comparison.
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Daulton Lee
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Sentence

Boyce: 40 years imHighly sensitive data relatprisonment; Lee: life
ing to U.S. satellite systems
imprisonment

USSR

Technical manual relating to
one of America’s most im- 40 years imprisonment
portant spy satellites

Henry David
1980 Barnett, CIA em- USSR
ployee

Became a mole at the behest
of the KGB; sold CIA se18 years imprisonment
crets

1978

1981

William Peter
Kampiles

Joseph George
Helmich

William Holden
Bell
Jonathan Jay
1985
Pollard
1981

Information relating to a
“Top Secret” U.S. communi- Life imprisonment
cations system

USSR

Large amount of military re8 years imprisonment
lated technology

Israel;
China

Life imprisonment

USSR

Spied for nine years and
handed over comprehensive
blueprints of U.S. collection
Life imprisonment
operations against the Russians including the identities
of undercover agents

Robert Hanssen,
USSR
FBI special agent

Over 6,000 pages of classified documents on sensitive
national security programs,
including the details of U.S.
Life imprisonment
nuclear war defenses. Also
revealed the identities of
Russian agents working for
the United States

Aldrich Ames,
1994 CIA Counterintelligence Chief

2001

USSR

Ana Belen Mon2001 tes, Senior Ana- Cuba
lyst for DIA
231

25 years
imprisonment231

The information in this table is from DEF. PERSONNEL SECURITY RES.
CENTER, ESPIONAGE AND OTHER COMPROMISES OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CASE
SUMMARIES FROM 1975 TO 2008 (2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/esp-summ.pdf.
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The bias and contrast between how federal judges sentence those
who steal classified information versus unclassified trade secrets is
similar to the disparity and contrast between the sentences handed
out for cases involving violent criminals versus white collar crime
offenders.
According to the United States Sentencing Commission, the average prison sentence length (not actual time served) every year
from 1991 to 2001 for white-collar and corporate criminals was between 19.0 and 20.8 months. During the same period, however, violent offenders’ and drug offenders’ sentences ranged from 89.5 to
106.7 months and 71.7 to 88.2 months, respectively. Often, whitecollar criminals have been given lighter sentences than petty robbers.232
When comparing economic espionage sentences to federal violent crime sentences, we also see a trend towards harshly penalizing
offenders of violent crimes much more than economic spies. Perhaps this is because economic espionage tends to look more like a
white collar crime and white collar crime is treated more softly than
violent crime.233
3. PRIVATE INDUSTRY INDIFFERENCE
One of the main reasons why there are so few economic espionage convictions in the U.S. is the lack of buy-in from the private
sector. Currently, companies are not legally required to report a loss
of sensitive information or a remote computer intrusion to the
232

J. Scott Dutcher, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications
for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1300, 1301–02 (2005) (“While the robber with the fountain pen often causes much
more economic harm than the man with the six-gun, the fountain-pen robber has
traditionally been treated less harshly. Historically, white-collar crime in the
United States has been punished very lightly in comparison to violent crimes
where the victim is physically injured or put at risk to be physically injured. “In
the federal system, the argument that white-collar offenders receive shorter sentences than street criminals who commit proportional crimes has strong empirical
backing”).
233
Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J.
485, at 487–88 (1998-1999) (“One study, which examined violations by Fortune
500 corporations over a two-year period, found that corporate executives were
convicted in only 1.5% of all enforcement actions”).
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FBI.234 Private companies fear the disclosure that their trade secrets
have been stolen may impact their shareholders’ and the public’s
view of the health and stability of the company due to the theft. How
will the theft impact the stock price? Announcing a security breach
of this nature could tarnish a company’s reputation and endanger its
relationships with investors, bankers, suppliers, customers, and
other stakeholders.
The result is few companies disclose the theft. “Google announced in 2010 that China-based hackers had raided its networks,”
and stolen its source code.235 At the same time, at least thirty-four
other companies were also victims of the same cyberattack, but only
two, Intel and Adobe Systems, Inc. admitted to being hacked.236
Companies also fear that the trade secret may be disclosed in
court, thus further devaluing their work. This fear is unfounded since
the EEA contains a special provision in section 1835 to protect
against the disclosure of specific trade secret information throughout criminal proceedings, which includes discovery, pre-trial, and
trial proceedings.237 The judge issues a protective order precluding
either side from mentioning trade secret specifics.238
Another reason for the lack of prosecutions lies in the fact that
oftentimes, it can take a company years to learn the technology was

234

The Defense Security Service currently requires cleared defense contractors to report any IP theft to the FBI. Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Cleared Industry Reporting, DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE 10 (2013),
http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2013%20Unclass%20Targeting%20US%20Technologies_FINAL.pdf
235
Riley & Walcott, supra note 11.
236
Riley & Walcott, supra note 11. “I can’t find an organization, an entity, a
business, or a department that hasn’t suffered from cyber intrusions.” Piore, supra
note 11 (quoting Gordon M. Snow, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division)
(internal quotations omitted).
237
18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2012).
238
Id.
“In any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter
such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to
preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of
the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and all other applicable laws. An interlocutory appeal by the United States shall
lie from a decision or order of a district court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any trade secret.” Id.
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stolen.239 A company may only learn of the theft when a foreign
competitor puts out the very same product at a significantly reduced
price. The loss of this technology can come from a trusted insider or
from a computer intrusion. According to Mandiant, an American cybersecurity firm, it takes an average of 229 days for organizations to
discover their breach.240 In 2013, only 33% of organizations selfdetected a breach compared to 37% in 2012.241
American businessmen and women have also demonstrated a
certain apathy towards economic espionage, almost arguing that,
while it is unfair, it is inevitable. Perhaps the act of stealing trade
secrets hits too close to home, e.g., the “tool kit” defense (“I’m collecting work information for my own future, personal use”), which
seems reasonable and understandable. “A recent survey by the
Ponemon Institute and Symantec showed that close to 60 percent of
employees who have resigned or been terminated admit they stole
company data.”242 And “less than 3 percent of all information technology and security dollars are spent to safeguard electronic or hard
copy corporate information.”243 Moreover, if companies spent significant amounts of money on cybersecurity and the company is, in
fact, never hacked or information never stolen, then business executives are left answering to shareholders as to why they spent so
much money with no tangible benefit. This motivates executives to
risk the cyber threat and spend the money on other business needs.

239
Moreover, when companies identify the theft, “it is . . . difficult to assign
an economic value to some types of stolen information . . . . [F]or example, it
would be nearly impossible to estimate the monetary value of talking points for a
meeting between officials from a [U.S.] company and foreign counterparts.”
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
240
MANDIANT, 2014 THREAT REPORT: BEYOND THE BREACH 1 (2014).
241
MANDIANT, supra note 240, at 1. “Previously ‘the No. 1 priority was to
protect the operational security of the investigation and the prosecutive equities
on the criminal side.’ While those goals are still important, ‘it’s even more important that the victims understand they have been victimized.’” Piore, supra note
11 (quoting Jonathan Pollet, the founder of Red Tiger Security in Houston).
242
Employers: Keep your trade secrets secret, BUS. LEGAL RESOURCES (August 27, 2013), http://hr.blr.com/HR-news/Staffing-Training/EmploymentContracts/Employers-Keep-your-trade-secrets-secret. See also Keep Your Secrets
Locked Up Tight, HR NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://inshaiimtprofessionalcollege.blogspot.com/2011/04/keep-your-secrets-locked-up-tight.html.
243
Id.
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While some believe U.S. economic success hinges on innovation
and new technology, along with certain proprietary protections provided to the innovators in compensation for the risks they take, others feel the U.S. is an open society and intellectual property should
be shared with the world at large for the benefit of mankind. A case
in point is that of J. Reece Roth, Professor Emeritus at the University
of Tennessee in the Engineering Department and project manager,
who was hired to develop plasma based aerodynamic controls for
use in small unmanned aerial vehicles and guided munitions, and
was convicted of violating the Arms Export Control Act in 2011.244
Roth had hired a Chinese national and Iranian national as graduate
students to work on a top secret military project after signing a contract specifically stating that no foreign persons were permitted to
work on the project.245
Companies have always gathered their own intelligence—examples include looking at a competitor’s prices, soliciting feedback
from customers, conducting surveys or public views on competitor
practices and product value, etc. While most business “executives
would agree that protecting a company’s confidential data and trade
secrets from the prying eyes of competitors is critical,”one study of
senior IT security executives “revealed that 65 percent [of executives] are aware that their company has experienced a computer intrusion in which data was stolen, and 55 percent have discovered a
current employee or insider taking information from the company’s
computer system to use in a competing business.”246 This leads one
to believe corporate theft may be prevalent, but apparently it is not
enough of a concern to spend significant time and resources to fix
the problem.

244

Tom Chester, Feds Investigating Retired UT Professor, KNOXVILLE NEWS
SENTINEL (July 11, 2006), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local-news/feds-investigating-retired-ut-professor. See generally United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d
827 (6th Cir. 2011).
245
United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 2011).
246
What Are The Top Security Concerns of Senior IT Executives?, NET
SECURITY (June 4, 2014), http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=16955
[hereinafter Top Security Concerns of Senior IT Executives]. According to Gordon M. Snow, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, “We have to have a
cultural shift in the nation where we understand that there is no secure system,
that people are going to be hacked.” Piore, supra note 11.
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There is a great likelihood that U.S. corporate executives, in particular, do not understand the full extent of existing cybersecurity
risks or the employee insider threat. As to cybersecurity risks, a 2012
Carnegie Mellon University CyLab report revealed that
corporate boards and executives are taking risk management seriously but there is still a gap in understanding the link between information technology
(IT) risks and enterprise risk management. This gap
indicates that boards have a lack of understanding of
how all business operations are supported by computer systems and digital data and how risks in these
areas can undermine operations. Less than two-thirds
of the respondents’ organizations have full-time personnel in key roles for privacy and security . . . [and]
Asian boards (76 percent) are much more likely to
have a board Risk Committee responsible for privacy
and security than North American (40 percent) and
European (38 percent) boards.247

247

Top Executives in Critical Infrastructure Cite Need for Improvement in
Managing Cyber Risks, EMC (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Top Executives],
http://www.emc.com/about/news/press/2012/20120516-01.htm. See also Jody R.
Westby, How Boards & Senior Executives Are Managing Cyber Risks, CARNEGIE
MELLON U. CYLAB 5–7, 24 (May 16, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CYBER%20Carneigie%20Mellon%20report.pdf;
Energy, Other Utilities’ Cybersecurity is Weak, U.S. SENATE’S HOMELAND
SECURITY & GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter Energy], https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/energy-other-utilities-cybersecurity-is-weak.According to the third biennial Carnegie Mellon University CyLab survey of boards of directors and senior management, “57 percent
of energy and utility company executives said they rarely or never reviewed security program assessments. The energy sector and other utilities ranked lowest
among industries in security management of their cyber assets.” Energy, supra.
“The U.S. generally believes it is the global leader in security, but the survey results indicate that North American boards lag behind European and Asian boards
in undertaking key activities associated with privacy and security governance
such as regular reviews involving annual budgets, roles and responsibilities, and
top-level policies.” Top Executives, supra.
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As Richard Clarke once suggested, are U.S. businesses waiting
for a “cyber Pearl Harbor”248 to occur before addressing the problem?
4. THE WEAK RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY

The United States has been labeled “hypocritical” in that the
U.S. government has been accused of authorizing intelligence gathering against allies and enemies alike while at the same time Congress has made economic espionage illegal. This comment was especially made after Edward Snowden disclosed the depth of the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) surveillance capabilities in June
of 2013, and countries began to justify their own espionage activities
by arguing “you do it too” and “we’re just trying to keep up.”249 In
fact, after the Snowden disclosures, experts in counterintelligence

248
At a Milken Institute conference in 2014, Richard Clarke, CEO of Good
Harbor Security Risk Management and a former U.S counterterrorism official,
stated, “What companies have to realize is, while we’re waiting for a cyber Pearl
Harbor that may become a national problem, companies have a problem every
day . . . What you’re losing every day is intellectual property, research and development, and business intelligence, and you’re losing money because they create
accounts payable and send money offshore.” Rick Newman, China May Have
Hacked Your Company, Too, YAHOO FINANCE (May 20, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/china-has-probably-hacked-your-company--too175016269.html.
249
China argues that the U.S. is the nation state leading the cyberwar, and it
needs to do more to protect itself in the coming years. J. Nicholas Hoover, NSA
Chief: China Behind RSA Attacks, DARK READING (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:12 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/security/232700341; NSA
Chief: Chinese Steal a “Great Deal” of Military-Related Intellectual Property,
and Were Responsible for Last year’s Attacks on Cybersecurity Company RSA,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 27, 2012); The Liberation Army Daily, an unofficial
but well-vetted source, issued a report, which stated, “The U.S. military is hastening to seize the commanding military heights on the Internet, and another Internet war is being pushed to a stormy peak . . . .Their actions remind us that to
protect the nation’s Internet security, we must accelerate Internet defense development and accelerate steps to make a strong Internet army.” Paul Rosenzweig,
Beware of Cyber China, HOOVER INSTITUTION (March 15, 2012),
http://www.hoover.org/research/beware-cyber-china.
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reported “a fivefold increase in physical espionage attempts against
U.S. businesses” and a threefold increase in cyberespionage.250
News articles such as those written by Glenn Greenwald, who
interviewed Snowden in Hong Kong, certainly fanned the flames. In
one article, Greenwald referenced an email written by an NSA
spokesperson who claims “‘[t]he department does ***not*** engage in economic espionage in any domain, including cyber,’” yet
Greenwald pointed out that the NSA has been found to spy on
“plainly financial targets such as the Brazilian oil giant Petrobas;
economic summits; international credit card and banking systems;
the EU antitrust commissioner investigating Google, Microsoft, and
Intel; and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.”251
In response to the Petrobas spying allegations, Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) James Clapper stated, “It is not a secret
that the Intelligence Community (“IC”) collects information about
economic and financial matters . . . .What we do not do, as we have
said many times, is use our foreign intelligence capabilities to steal
the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of—or give intelligence we collect to—U.S. companies to enhance their international
competitiveness or increase their bottom line.”252
250

Joshua Philipp, After Snowden, Global Espionage Increased Fivefold,
EPOCH TIMES (May 30, 2014), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/704132-aftersnowden-global-espionage-increased-fivehold/?photo=4. According to Verizon’s
2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, “[t]he United States was by far the largest target of cyberespionage, being hit with 87 percent of espionage incidents . . . .South Korea was second, being targeted by 6 percent of attacks.” Id.
251
Glenn Greenwald, The U.S. Government’s Secret Plans to Spy for American Corporations, INTERCEPT, (Sept. 5, 2014), https://theintercept.com/
2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-americancorporations. See also GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 134–35. “Much of the
Snowden archive revealed what can only be called economic espionage: eavesdropping and email interception aimed at the Brazilian oil giant Petrobras, economic conferences in Latin America, energy companies in Venezuela and Mexico, and spying by the NSA’s allies—including Canada, Norway, and Sweden—
on the Brazilian ministry of Mines and Energy and energy companies in several
other countries.” Id.
252
Greenwald cites a DNI-sponsored 2009 Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report (“QICR”) that appears to provide evidence, albeit inconclusive, that at a minimum the U.S. Intelligence Community has contingency
plans to engage in economic espionage under certain scenarios that specifically
threaten national security. GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 135. See also
OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE
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Obviously, the U.S. cannot make economic espionage illegal,
admonish other countries for engaging in these practices, and then
do the same in secret. After an exhaustive search looking for evidence that the U.S. government passes on pilfered economic intelligence to aid domestic private business, one can only find allegations
of collection, but not evidence of an actual transfer of secrets to private enterprise.253 Even Glenn Greenwald admits in his book No
COMMUNITY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT APRIL 2009 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT 2009], https://pdf.yt/d/NKHjTMZwaSYhg1KP. The report described
how “experts from across the [IC], other U.S. departments and agencies, academia, think tanks, and industry assessed the implications of the year 2025 for the
IC.” Id. at i. “QICR 2009 developed alternative future scenarios based on Global
Trends 2025 to explore concepts and capabilities the IC may need to fulfill critical
missions in support of U.S. national security.” Id. However, “[i]t d[id] not purport
that any one future will materialize, but rather outlined a range of plausible futures
so that the IC could best posture itself to meet the range of challenges it may face.”
Id.
In response to Greenwald’s inquiries about QICR 2009 and future plans
for U.S. government-sponsored industrial espionage—which was contemplated
under one dire scenario—U.S. officials continue to insist that using surveillance
capabilities to bestow economic advantage for the benefit of a country’s corporations is wrong, immoral, and illegal. Yet according to Greenwald, this 2009 report
advocates doing exactly that in the event “that the technological capacity of foreign multinational corporations could outstrip that of U.S. corporations.”
GREENWALD, supra note 193 (internal quotations omitted). Using covert cyber
operations to pilfer “proprietary information” and then determining how it ”would
be useful to U.S. industry” is precisely what the U.S. government has been vehemently insisting it does not do, even though for years it has officially prepared to
do precisely that. Id.
253
“[F]ormer U.S. officials insist the government does not engage in economic espionage or intellectual property theft from foreign companies. In part,
they contend that’s because there is little IP we would want to steal, and to do so
would undercut our efforts to discourage such theft by other nations. Private U.S.
companies, meanwhile, would be breaking U.S. law if they hacked into the servers
of state-owned competitors in places like China and Russia.” Piore, supra note
11. Joel Brenner, former head of U.S. counterintelligence during the Bush and
Obama administrations, has said, “The U.S. has an enormous stake in the integrity
of the intellectual property regime . . . Many of our adversaries don’t believe we
don’t do this. But it’s really true. We don’t.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
“[T]his apparent unwillingness to retaliate presents an ‘asymmetric disadvantage’
that our rivals are exploiting to win an emerging digital cold war.” Id. (quoting a
digital security expert at the Washington D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies). “The New York Times noted that its surveillance targets often included financial institutions and ‘heads of international aid organizations,
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Place to Hide that the National Security Agency (“NSA”) “acts for
the benefit of what it calls its ‘customers,’ a list that includes not
only the White House, the State Department, and the CIA, but also
primarily economic agencies such as the US Trade Representative
and the Department of Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce.”254
Espionage is a reality. All countries conduct espionage, and their
main intention is to collect data.255 This data is collected so governments may learn of the intentions, capabilities, and motivations of
other nation states. It would be extremely helpful for any government official to learn the strategies of foreign competitors before
trade and economic talks just as it is important to learn the military
battle plans of adversaries before an actual engagement of hostilities.256

foreign energy companies and a European Union official involved in antitrust battles with American technology businesses . . . .’ U.S. and British agencies ‘monitored the communications of senior European Union officials, foreign leaders including African heads of state, directors of United Nation and other relief programs [such as UNICEF], and officials overseeing oil and finance ministries . . . .’
When the United States uses the NSA to eavesdrop on the planning strategies of
other countries during trade and economic talks, it can gain enormous advantage
for American industry.” GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 138.
254
GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 135–36.
255
“Allies often suspect each other of economic espionage—underlining how
countries can be partners in traditional security matters yet competitors in business
and trade . . . . According to a 2010 press report, the Germans view France and
the United States as the primary perpetrators of economic espionage ‘among
friends.’ France’s Central Directorate for Domestic Intelligence has called China
and the United States the leading ‘hackers’ of French businesses, according to a
2011 press report.” COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at B–2.
256
Hillary Clinton is quoted as saying: “When I would go to China or I would
go to Russia . . . we would leave all my electronic equipment on the plane with
the batteries out, because this is a new frontier and they’re trying to find out not
just about what we do in our government, they’re trying to find out about what a
lot of companies do and they were going after the personal emails of people who
worked in the State Department. It’s not like the only government in the world
that is doing anything is the United States.” Daily Mail Reporter, ‘His Leaks
Helped Terrorists’: Hillary Clinton Blasts NSA Leaker Edward Snowden, DAILY
MAIL (last updated Apr. 26, 2014, 8:52 AM) (internal quotations omitted),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2613670/His-leaks-helped-terroristsHillary-Clinton-blasts-NSA-leaker-EdwardSnowden.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490.
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What distinguishes the United States from, say, China, is that the
U.S. does not steal economic intelligence or foreign proprietary corporate information to benefit American private industry. In countries such as China, France, Israel, and Russia, where industry is
promoted by its government and private business has extensive ties
to the government, there is a strong possibility that any economic
and trade intelligence collected may be shared with private or stateowned businesses in those countries to one degree or another.
The United States government has been given the authority to
undertake economic espionage under the inherent executive powers
assigned to the President within Article II of the U.S. Constitution.
Article II provides that all executive powers shall be vested in the
President of the United States, and one aspect of this power is the
authority to conduct espionage for purposes of national security,
e.g., General Washington authorized the use of spies during the Revolutionary War.257 Typically, this has involved political espionage
rather than economic espionage. The federal courts, though, have
not drawn a line segregating one from the other and have been loath
to limit the President’s use of executive authority when dealing with
foreign nations and international disputes.258
With such authority provided, why then has economic espionage
been abjured by the United States when our allies and competitors
do it all the time? There are several reasons, including the concept
of federalism, which creates a distance between the federal government and private industry; the U.S. political culture; and the First
Amendment, which keeps our capitalist economy open for all and
allows for uninhibited lobbying by domestic and international companies.
The U.S. government, rooted in federalism principles, is prohibited from acting on behalf of U.S. companies. The national government is one of limited and enumerated powers, with states retaining
257
Madalyn Velie, Espionage Tactics, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT
VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/espionagetactics/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (discussing President George Washington’s
use of spies).
258
See the Chaco Border Dispute that was the basis for United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 3330–31 (1936), and see the Iran
hostage crisis that was the basis for Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662–
66, 278–79 (1981).
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residual powers such as registering companies.259 Unlike unitary
states like the UK or France where companies register with and are
licensed by the central government, in the U.S., this is done at the
state level and therefore the connection between companies and the
federal government is much weaker. Moreover, states are prohibited
from favoring an in-state company over an out-of-state competitor.
Under the dormant or negative commerce clause, the Supreme Court
has prohibited state governments from imposing impediments to
foreign and out of state commerce, e.g., states cannot favor a local
dairy or agrarian interest over an out-of-state rival.260
Second, the United States, more than others, is premised on a
free market ideology that corresponds with a limited national government. The U.S. government and U.S. political culture see the optimal outcome resulting from a free market allocation of resources
and have chosen, unlike France or China, to not pick “national winners” in industry. Most American government officials do not believe economic espionage will enrich the nation, but will, most
likely lead to retaliatory measures taken against American companies and individuals, which would be harmful because the U.S. remains the world’s superpower with the largest economy in the
world.
The United States, as the largest developed economy in the
world, promotes an open and fair trading system to engender economic growth, democracy and international stability; the government remains focused on international trade rules, which, other
things being equal, create the most favorable outcome for American
industry and workers. As such, the U.S. has sought to lead by example and perhaps downplay the occasional loss of intellectual property when allies take advantage of our openness.
Lastly, the United States is part of a global economy where large
multi-national corporations employ tens of thousands of people in
dozens of countries worldwide. It would be difficult for the U.S. to
steal trade secrets from one foreign corporation which perhaps employs thousands of American workers, share the pilfered intellectual
property with a U.S.-based company in the same industry, and know
259

Article I, Section 8, enumerated those limited powers, such as regulating
interstate commerce, taxing and spending, but not the residual power to assist local companies. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
260
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522–22 (1935).
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with any certainty these actions would not negatively impact the
U.S.-based employees of that foreign entity. It is no longer clear who
actually benefits and who is harmed from economic espionage in an
interconnected global economy. It is possible to help one American
company only to injure another. For example, imagine if the U.S.
undertook espionage on behalf of General Motors or Chrysler
against Volkswagen or Toyota. Although this might seem like a benefit to executives and employees at American car companies located
in the industrial northeast and Midwest, it would be harmful to other
Americans, such as workers in Tennessee and Kentucky where
Volkswagen and Toyota have a large presence.
Thus, the U.S. system of federalism, capitalism, and individualism, and the fact that the U.S. sees itself as protector of the world’s
open trading system, best explains why economic espionage is not
supported or tolerated by the U.S. government except in its current
limited role, in that some economic intelligence is collected for national security purposes.
5. WHY THE GLOBAL RESPONSE HAS BEEN WEAK
“There’s no country where we have a no-spy agreement.”
—President Barack Obama261
Espionage is a dirty business. Spies act outside international, traditional norms in comparison to military maneuvers, which, for the
most part, follow established international rules. A soldier is given
the courtesy of POW status when engaging in combat and conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. A

261

Zeke J. Miller, Obama: “There’s No Country Where We Have a No-Spy
Agreement”, TIME (Feb. 11, 2014) (This was President Obama’s response when
asked at a joint press conference with French President Francois Hollande
“whether his choice of France for the first state visit of the second term indicated
a new special relationship that would result in an extension of a so-called ‘no-spy’
agreement with the European ally.”), http://time.com/6398/obama-theres-nocountry-where-we-have-a-no-spy-agreement. Hollande responded by saying “he
and Obama had put the controversy behind them, but said there must be an expectation of privacy for ordinary people around the world. ‘Following the revelations
that appeared due to Snowden, we clarified things, Mr. Obama and myself, we
clarified things. And then this was in the past,’ Hollande said ‘Mutual trust has
been restored.’” Id.
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spy, when caught, is usually criminally prosecuted or held without
POW status.
There is a general distaste for espionage. But economic espionage seems to engender a less visceral emotion, and governments
are more forgiving in cases of intellectual property theft compared
to the typical political and military espionage of the Cold War era.
While political and military espionage seems to bring out aggressive, nationalistic tendencies to the forefront, economic espionage
seems to be tied to a nation’s economic survival, and therefore,
deemed more “acceptable.”
There are several factors that might influence a particular government to either support or reject the idea of state-sponsored economic espionage. The biggest factor, of course, is money and prosperity for one’s people. Historically, as trends go, developing countries
manufacture[] lower-technology products and provide[] lower-technology services for sale to the more
developed countries. The developed countries,
meanwhile, close[] entire industries and convert[]
their labor forces to work on more advanced products
and services based on newly invented products and
processes. Prosperity increase[s] as new technologies dr[i]ve productivity gains and wages r[i]se.
[Several] [c]ountries [have] moved up the technology ladder.262
However, moving up the technology ladder has become a much
quicker proposition for some, especially if the trade secrets of one’s
competitors can be legally or illegally acquired, and so the concept
of economic espionage is born.263
Developed countries with advanced intellectual property (IP)
want to protect, benefit and promote their competitive advantage, so
these countries enact laws to safeguard IP and reward entrepreneurs
for sweat equity and taking risks. These laws are necessary, since
“illegal theft of intellectual property . . . undermine[s] both the
262
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means and the incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate, which[, [in
turn,] slow[s] development of new inventions” and scientific discoveries.264 On the other hand, developing countries have no incentive
to protect what they do not have, and in an effort to catch up and
become competitive themselves and bring economic prosperity to
their people, those with a perceived need have little incentive to play
by the same rules.265
Governments that are heavily intertwined with private industry
are more likely to conduct economic espionage for the benefit of the
private sector. Countries that have a nationalistic view of the
“global” marketplace, and represent a target-rich environment of advanced technology for their competitors, tend to have strict IP protection laws and economic espionage-type criminal statutes. However, other countries that are just as nationalistic from an economic
perspective, but have minimal protectionist industrial policies and
poor legal environments for IP protection, may be among the countries that either support or condone economic espionage. Developed
countries that have more to lose from the theft of their trade secrets
and who value innovation (such as the United States) obviously favor enforcing and prosecuting economic crimes.
However, some developed countries, such as Canada and New
Zealand, countries that have EEA-type legal protections in place,
have not prosecuted anyone for such crimes; this perhaps may suggest that at least some in those governments believe that such prosecutions actually inhibit innovation and productivity rather than protect it. Then there is the perspective of many in countries such as
China, Russia, and perhaps India, where intellectual property theft
seems to be justified since it ensures a level playing field amongst
developed and developing countries.266
In short order, economic espionage begins to look less like a
moral judgment and more like a different perspective on the rule of
law. While the U.S. is quick to label other governments as thieves,
other countries may not consider what they are doing as wrong. Why
is this so? While the U.S. capitalist system seeks to strongly protect
property interests, other cultures seem to view intellectual property
264
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through a different lens and are less willing to declare IP a uniquely
protected right.
Different conceptions of ownership and types of political governance may shape each country’s unique view of the rule of law.
The U.S. does not have public ownership of private property,
whereas China has a history of common ownership of property.
Similarly, the U.S. does not have the collusion between government
and business like the state-owned industries in France or the possible
collusion between the oligarchs and the Russian government.
The concept of individualism may also explain why the U.S. is
the only nation to have utilized its economic espionage laws to prosecute offenders, whereas countries like Germany and Canada, which
are more social welfare states, have not. The United States may have
the strongest protections in the world, but in other countries such as
Germany, while there is no specific economic espionage statute,
trade and business secrets are protected albeit in less specific legal
provisions.
The U.S. (and the Western world for the most part) tends to cherish individualism (“Be yourself! Set your own standard! Just say
no!”),267 whereas China and the East tend to value harmony and
group solidarity (“Fit in with the others! Don’t stick out! Find a way
to say yes!”).268 These priorities in values demonstrate that China
would be more willing to condone stealing trade secrets for the benefit of state-owned industry than a country such as the U.S., which
emphasizes fair competition, individual ingenuity, and innovation.
Lastly, another reason why the global response to IP theft and
economic espionage has been so weak is because historically, many
nations have condoned these activities, including ironically in earlier years the United States. In the 19th century, the United States
was known for stealing from the British, particularly in the textile
industry.269 American citizen, Francis Cabot Lowell, moved to Scotland in 1811 and secretly stole the plans to the Cartwright loom, a
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water-driven weaving machine that almost singlehandedly had provided Britain with a booming economy.270 Lowell then moved back
to Boston, built a version of the Cartwright loom, and founded a
town (Lowell) that “provided the first big shock that jolted America
into the industrial age.”271
Centuries earlier, the British did the same to the Chinese. The
British, known for their love of tea, had a plant, camellia sinensis,272
smuggled out of China and into India.273 In 1848, Robert Fortune,
working for the East India Company (with ties to the British government),
‘learned Mandarin, shaved his head, adopted a pigtail
as worn by Manchus, dressed in local clothes and disguised himself as a Chinese from a distant province.
He sneaked into remote areas of Fujian and Jiangsu
province, forbidden parts of China. Fortune managed
to collect 20,000 plants and seedlings and had then
transported it to Kolkata [(India)] in Wardian cases,
small greenhouses which kept the plants healthy due
to condensation within the case . . . .’ These seedlings
were planted in Darjeeling and grew into bushes that
over the time produced the unique tea . . . .’[T]he
knowledge that he brought back from China together
with plants were instrumental in what is today a huge
flourishing tea industry in India.’274
Now, with the Chinese stealing trade secrets from U.S. business
entities, we have come full circle, since centuries earlier Chinese
discoveries and technology were pilfered by the West. Some Chinese believe history justifies their current behavior, especially in
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view of “The Century of Humiliation,” referring to the West’s exploitation of China since the mid-19th century.275 China was exploited and humiliated for over 100 years by an international system
that strengthened their competitors and kept China weak, isolated,
and divided. So China and its business community believe they have
a right to do whatever they can get away with to assume their rightful place in the world. Some countries see no contradiction or harm
in stealing the intellectual property of other nations. After all, is it
not true that everything is fair in love, war and business?
Self-justification and feelings about the theft of trade secrets
vary. The severity of the problem is certainly underestimated. Some
nations and its citizens find theft of trade secrets from foreign competitors acceptable and deemed critical to the stability of their nation’s economy; others find it unacceptable and blatantly illegal.
Some countries will take extreme measures to improve or ensure the
survival of their respective economies, even to include the outright
theft of trade secrets. Regardless of one’s particular view on the issue, the global response to economic espionage has been weak and
ineffectual.
V. CONCLUSION
In the United States, theft of trade secrets is illegal.276 Competitive intelligence, also known as open-source intelligence, is perfectly legal. Every intelligence agency collects sensitive foreign political, military, technical and economic information. This intelligence is provided to government leaders to aid them in making policy decisions. In the case of economic and technical information,
e.g., trade secrets, some foreign governments share that intelligence
with domestic and state-owned industry providing those companies
with a distinct unfair advantage over their foreign competitors. This
is theft of intellectual property, the protection of which is a cornerstone of capitalism and free enterprise. The U.S. government denies
stealing foreign trade secrets or intellectual property for the benefit
275
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of U.S. private industry; however, the U.S. Intelligence Community
(“USIC”) readily admits acquiring foreign economic intelligence for
legitimate government purposes.
In 1996, when former President Bill Clinton signed the Economic Espionage Act, the U.S. government identified somewhere
between 23 and 51 foreign nations, which were targeting sensitive
U.S. technologies through human espionage and other means.277
Since then, the USIC’s annual assessment of countries spying on the
U.S. has climbed consistently to well over 100 foreign countries including both adversaries and allies.278 Countries now view national
power and national security in economic terms, and the key to U.S.
wealth and economic well being is our trade secrets. Since the U.S.
is the most technologically advanced country, there is no doubt that
its intellectual property is being targeted by multiple state-and-private actors.
BlackOps Partners Corporation, which does counterintelligence and protection of trade secrets and competitive advantage for Fortune 500 companies, estimates that $500 billion in raw innovation is stolen
from U.S. companies each year. Raw innovation includes trade secrets, research and development, and
products that give companies a competitive advantage. ‘When this innovation is meant to drive revenue, profit, and jobs for at least 10 years, we are losing the equivalent of $5 trillion out of the U.S. economy every year to economic espionage,’ said Casey
Fleming, CEO of BlackOps Partners Corporation.279
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If the gross domestic product for the U.S. was $16.7 trillion dollars in 2013280 with approximately 116 million full-time workers,
how many additional U.S. jobs would have been created with an additional $5 trillion dollars of GDP? Economic espionage is obviously a major concern.
Unfortunately, the U.S. response to economic espionage has
been relatively weak due to only a few actual convictions; poor reporting by the U.S. business community due to its fear of disclosure
and damage to its reputation; private industries’ lax cybersecurity
and poor security against insider employee theft; and U.S. private
sector apathy, or at best, feelings of inevitability that loss of trade
secrets is merely a cost of doing business.
While the U.S. values innovation and spends billions281 on
R&D, the U.S. will more than likely not follow the example of China
and Russia, or even France for that matter, where government and
business interests are intricately entwined. The U.S. government
structure is such that there will always be a separation between government and private industry and its citizens value their privacy sufficiently that corporations would be reluctant to become intimate
partners with government agencies. What could change this dynamic? Economic espionage and the wholesale loss of U.S. intellectual property for one thing. If economic espionage goes unchecked
in America, this could kill American innovation and the incentive to
invest in technology, and ultimately lead to the Orwellian predictions discussed in Global Trends 2030, a futuristic study conducted
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “In 2030, Asia
will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms
of global power . . . .China’s GDP . . . is likely be about 140-percent
larger than Japan’s.”282 “A reinvigorated US economy”—spurred by
280
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possible US energy dependence—”would increase the prospects
that the growing global and regional challenges would be addressed.”283 If the US fails to rebound, “[a] dangerous global power
vacuum would be created.”284
U.S. businesses need to become educated, aware, and more proactive. Economic espionage and cyberattacks are not going away, in
fact, it is getting worse.285 Criminal prosecutions and sanctions
should increase at a bare minimum, as this will send a strong message to other countries engaged in state-sponsored theft of trade secrets.
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Id. “[I]t took Britain 155 years to double GDP per capita, with about 9
million people . . . The US and Germany took between 30 and 60 years with a few
tens of million people . . . but India and China are doing this at a scale and pace
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it was before 1500.” Id. at 2.
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However, an increase in Department of Justice and FBI resources to investigate and prosecute cases of trade-secret theft, especially by cyber means, plus enhanced outreach efforts to educate
the private sector, will be insufficient to blunt the problem of IP theft
and economic espionage. These efforts are merely putting a bandaid on an open artery. It is only until the theft becomes personal that
businesses, employees, and the government will pay attention and
take it seriously. A more holistic view and overreaching strategy is
necessary,286 and an understanding of how other nations perceive
this problem and how they confront it may also prove to be beneficial. The lack of universally acceptable and enforceable norms have
clearly undermined U.S. attempts to protect trade secrets. It is time
for the global community, not just the United States, to re-evaluate
these incredibly damaging activities and take drastic action to enact
sufficient penalties and sanctions to blunt this economic and national security problem.

286

Though outside the scope of this article, a starting point to redirect focus
would be to limit access to the American market for those foreign companies
identified as benefiting from competitive advantage through the fruits of trade
secret theft. The U.S. must change the cost-benefit calculus for foreign entities
that steal intellectual property. “Stealing American IP needs to have serious consequences, with costs sufficiently high that state and corporate behavior and policies that support IP theft are fundamentally changed. Companies that seek competitive advantages within the American market by using stolen intellectual property must find their access to that market made more difficult or thwarted altogether until they stop stealing.” see NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, supra
note 264, at 22. In addition, U.S. corporate tax rules should stop rewarding private
sector CEO’s who off-shore and out-source our manufacturing jobs and R&D to
China, where in short order the technology is stolen and used to compete against
their erstwhile American partners. For additional suggestions, see id. at 4–7.

